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UNINSURED MOTORIST LAW IN OKLAHOMA
Johnny C. Parker*
I bow to no one in my inability, at times, to understand the
convoluted language of insurance contracts; nor do I take a back seat to
anyone in my inability, at times, to resolve conflicting interpretations.
My search for reasoning in the development and application of insurance
law however has never been so tortured as now-when I find myself
immersed in the not so tranquil sea of uninsured motorist coverage. The
endless cases reveal only one universal truth-uninsured motorist
coverage is filled with algorithms, which often extend no further than the
cases which gave birth to their existence.
The coverage termed "uninsured motorist coverage" is surely
one of the most remarkable contractual undertakings ever
devised, for uninsured motorist coverage does not insure
uninsured motorists, (third parties); nor does it insure vehicles;
rather, uninsured motorist coverage affords first-party coverage
to person(s) for whom the insurance contract is being written. It,
thus, matches the complexity of the underlying policy and
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A., 1982, University of
Mississippi; J.D., 1984, University of Mississippi College of Law; LL.M., 1986,
Columbia University College of Law.
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affords benefits on account of a wide variety of losses . . . l
Uninsured motorist coverage disputes have "been treated to definitions,
principles and rules almost as varied as the fact-patterns presented to the
courts of the several states, but without the emergence of a single,
consistent line of reasoning which can serve as a guideline in the
determination of subsequent, similar cases.''2 This is so because
uninsured motorist jurisprudence is rooted in the abstract paradigm of
public policy: a paradigm ill-suited to predictability, certainty, and
uniformity in logic and reasoning.
This article surveys the uninsured motorist law of Oklahoma. Its
objective is to catalog the prevailing rules, principles, and analytical
standards used in Oklahoma to resolve uninsured motorist coverage
disputes. The survey starts from the broad perspective of identifying and
discussing doctrines and principles that are widely accepted as
foundational components of uninsured motorist law interpretation. Thus,
section I examines the principle of portability and the gap theory. It
further explains the logic and reasoning which underlie these concepts
and demonstrates that unity of purpose does not always equal unity of
application. Finally, section I explains how the gap theory has led to the
classification of uninsured motorist statutes as either minimum liability
or full recovery.
Section II examines the foundational requirements that must be
proven in order to recover uninsured motorist proceeds in Oklahoma.
This section explains the distinct role each prerequisite plays in the
overall coverage dispute. Although the organizational scheme of section
II segregates and focuses on the individual considerations of each
requirement, it is misleading to view the underlying requirements as
discrete. As demonstrated in section II, none of the requirements can
really be defined except by reference to the others.
Section III discusses the obligations and rights of the uninsured
motorist carrier. It examines the insurer's duty to investigate, evaluate,
negotiate, and pay the claim. Section III also explores the insurer's right
of subrogation against the uninsured motorist. As demonstrated by the
discussion in section III, the obligations owed by the insurer to its
insured are absolute, in that they may not be varied by contract or
breached. The insurer's right of subrogation, however, is conditional and
1. Silver v. Slusher, 770 P.2d 878, 885 (Okla. 1988) (Wilson, J., dissenting).
2. Porter v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 475 P.2d 258, 261 (Ariz. 1970).
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is subject to the principles of breach of contract, waiver, and estoppel.
Likewise, the insurer's right to intervene may be conditioned to avoid
prejudice.
I. FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
All states, except Michigan,3 have statutes making it mandatory for
uninsured motorist coverage to either be offered for purchase subject to
rejection,4 or actually provided.5 One purpose of uninsured motorist
3. Michigan enacted the Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Act, MCLS § 257.1106, to
serve the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.1106
(West 2001). See Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d 141 (Mich. 1980); see
also No-Fault Automobile Provisions, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3177 (West 2002).
Rights afforded by uninsured motorist coverage are purely contractual. Rory v. Cont'l
Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23 (Mich. 2005).
4. ALA. CODE § 32-7-23 (LexisNexis 1999); ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.440(b)(3)
(2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01(A) (Supp. 2008); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-
89-403, 404 (2004 & Supp. 2007); CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(a)(1) (2005 & Supp. 2009);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-609(l)(a) (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3902(a) (1999);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-2406(a)(1)(D), (f)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
627.727(1) (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:1OC-301(b)(3) (2005); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 41-2502 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-7-5-2(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2008); GA. CODE
ANN. § 33-7-11 (Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 516A. 1 (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-284(a) (2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.20-020(1) (LexisNexis 2006); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22:680 (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-11-101 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §
33-23-201(1) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 690B.020(l) (LexisNexis 2003); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301(A) (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(3) (Supp. 2008);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18A (LexisNexis 2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636(B)
(Supp. 2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 742.502 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2.1(a) (2008); 75
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1731 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-11-9 (2005); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 56-7-1201(a) (2008); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1952.101(a) (Vernon 2008);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-305 (2005 & Supp. 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
48.22.030(2) (LexisNexis 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-10-101 (2007); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 289 So. 2d 606 (Ala. 1974); Progressive Ins. Co. v. Simmons,
953 P.2d 510 (Alaska 1998); Spain v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 84 (Ariz. 1986);
Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Ellis, 868 S.W.2d 469 (Ark. 1994); Eliopulos v. N. River
Ins. Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 449 (Ct. App. 1963); Passamano v. Travelers Indem. Co., 882 P.2d
1312 (Colo. 1994); Humrnm v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 656 A.2d 712 (Del. 1995); Murrell
v. Criterion Ins. Co., 551 A.2d 95 (D.C. 1988); Mercury Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Anatkov, 929
So. 2d 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Abrohams v. Atd. Mut. Ins. Agency, 638 S.E.2d
330 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); Walton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 518 P.2d 1399 (Haw.
1974); Martinez v. Idaho Counties Reciprocal Mgmt. Program, 999 P.2d 902 (Idaho
2000); Beam v. Wausau Ins. Co., 765 N.E.2d 524 (Ind. 2002); Cronbaugh v. Farmland
Mut. Ins. Co., 475 N.W.2d 652 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991); Van Hoozer v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
549 P.2d 1354 (Kan. 1976); Jones v. Safeway Ins. Co. of La., 817 So. 2d 454 (La. Ct.
App. 2002); Trotter v. Fed. Ins. Co., 865 So. 2d 411 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); Bartell v.
Am. Home Assurance Co., 49 P.3d 623 (Mont. 2002); Hartz v. Mitchell, 822 P.2d 667
2009] 365
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statutes is to provide protection to insured motorists and passengers who
are injured through no fault of their own,6 but rather through the fault of
(Nev. 1991); State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kiehne, 641 P.2d 501 (N.M. 1982); Martin v.
Cont'l Ins. Co., 474 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Weddle v. Hayes, No. 96-BA-44,
1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4050 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997); Gray v. Midland Risk Ins.
Co., 925 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1996); White v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 680 P.2d 700 (Or. Ct.
App. 1984); Safe Auto Ins. Co. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 872 A.2d 247 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2005); Ferreira v. Integon Nat'l Ins. Co., 809 A.2d 1098 (R.I. 2002); Wegleitner v.
Sattler, 582 N.W.2d 688 (S.D. 1998); Dunn v. Hackett, 833 S.W.2d 78 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1992); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Elchehimi, 249 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2008); Clark v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1987); First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Perala, 648 P.2d 472 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Stamper, 732
P.2d 534 (Wyo. 1987).
5. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-336(a)(1) (West 2007); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/143a (West Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2902(1) (Supp. 2008); MD.
CODE ANN., INS. § 19-509 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, §
113L(1) (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.49 subd. 3a(1) (West Supp. 2009); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 379.203 (West 2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-6408(1) (2004); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 264:15(I) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1(a)(2)
(West 2007); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(f)(1) (McKinney Supp. 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE §
26.1-40-15.2 (Supp. 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-150(A) (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 941(a) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(A) (2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-
3 1(a) (LexisNexis 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 632.32(4) (West 2007); Mass v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co., 610 A.2d 1185 (Conn. 1992); Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052
(Ill. 1999); Gilchrist v. Defoe, 594 So. 2d 513 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Molleur v. Dairyland
Ins. Co., 942 A.2d 1197 (Me. 2008); Powell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 585 A.2d
286 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); Dworman v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 02-
1213B, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 164 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Apr. 5, 2006); Carlson v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 734 N.W.2d 695 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007); Kramer v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 54
S.W.3d 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Cont'l W. Ins. Co. v. Conn, 629 N.W.2d 494 (Neb.
2001); Soule v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 364 A.2d 883 (N.H. 1976); Rider Ins. Co. v. First
Trenton Cos., 808 A.2d 143 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); Raffellini v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 878 N.E.2d 583 (N.Y. 2007); DeCoteau v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 603
N.W.2d 906 (N.D. 2000); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Erwood, 644 S.E.2d 62 (S.C.
2007); Feeley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 882 A.2d 1230 (Vt. 2005); Gen. Accident Fire & Life
Assurance Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 158 S.E.2d 750 (Va. 1968); Jewell v. Ford,
590 S.E.2d 704 (W. Va. 2003); Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 717 N.W.2d 258
(Wis. 2006).
6. LeFevre v. Westberry, 590 So. 2d 154 (Ala. 1991); Peter v. Schumacher Enters.,
Inc., 22 P.3d 481 (Alaska 2001); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 88 Cal. Rptr. 593 (Ct. App.
1970); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. McDermott, 527 P.2d 918 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Washington, 641 A.2d 449 (Del. 1994); Armstrong v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 712 So. 2d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Loan
Corp. of Poplar, 231 S.E.2d 399 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); Liberty Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of
Haw., 883 P.2d 38 (Haw. 1994); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Petersen, 679 N.W.2d 571
(Iowa 2004); Forrester v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 517 P.2d 173 (Kan. 1973);
Thomas v. Nelson, 295 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Fortin v. York Mut. Ins. Co., No.
CV-91-517, 1997 Me. Super. LEXIS 4 (Me. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 1997); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. DeHaan, 900 A.2d 208 (Md. 2006); Washington v. Ga. Am. Ins. Co.,
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financially irresponsible drivers.7 Another objective is to provide the
same protection to the person injured by an uninsured motorist as if he
had been injured in an accident caused by an insured automobile.5 Thus,
540 So. 2d 22 (Miss. 1989); Wendell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 974 P.2d 623
(Mont. 1999); Herrera v. Am. Standard Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 140 (Neb. 1979);
Courtemanche v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. & Home Ins. Co., 385 A.2d 105 (N.H.
1978); Shaw v. City of Jersey City, 811 A.2d 404 (N.J. 2002); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Jones, 135 P.3d 1277 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006); Chavez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 533 P.2d 100 (N.M. 1975); White v. Ramirez, 607 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1994);
Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 204 S.E.2d 829 (N.C. 1974); Wright v. Fid. &
Cas. Co. of N.Y., 155 S.E.2d 100 (N.C. 1967); Webb v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 323
A.2d 737 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
7. O'Hare v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 432 So. 2d 1294 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982),
affd, 432 So. 2d 1300 (Ala. 1983); Nat'l Indem. Co. v. N. Am. Indem., No. 1 CA-CV
90-201, 1991 WL 263707 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1991); Pardon v. S. Farm Bureau Cas.
Ins. Co., 868 S.W.2d 468 (Ark. 1994); Mission Ins. Co. v. Brown, 407 P.2d 275 (Cal.
1965); Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 946 P.2d 584 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997);
D'Andrea v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CV0174433, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2683 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 2003); Armstrong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 712 So. 2d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998); Lee v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 763 P.2d 567 (Haw. 1988); Schuler v. Erie Ins.
Exch., 568 A.2d 873 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990); Sister Thattil v. Dom. Sisters of Charity
of the Present'n of the Blessed Virgin, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1993); Dunnam v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 So. 2d 668 (Miss. 1979); Arnold v. Am. Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 987 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); McGlynn v. Safeco Ins. Cos. of Am., 701
P.2d 735 (Mont. 1985); Hood v. AAA Motor Club Ins. Ass'n, 607 N.W.2d 814 (Neb.
2000); Wyatt v. Md. Cas. Co., 738 A.2d 949 (N.H. 1999); Shaw v. City of Jersey City,
811 A.2d 404 (N.J. 2002); Wright v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 155 S.E.2d 100 (N.C.
1967); N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 446 S.E.2d 364 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1994); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Speck, 393 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977);
Webb v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 323 A.2d 737 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974); Isaac v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 522 N.W.2d 752 (S.D. 1994); Grange Ins. Ass'n v. Hubbard,
667 P.2d 121 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
8. O'Hare v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 432 So. 2d 1294 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982),
affd, 432 So. 2d 1300 (Ala. 1983); Mancillas v. Ariz. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Fund, 897
P.2d 691 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Youngman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 971
S.W.2d 248 (Ark. 1998); Furlough v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 249 Cal. Rptr. 703 (Ct. App.
1988); Alliance Mut. Cas. Co. v. Duerson, 518 P.2d 1177 (Colo. 1974); Brown v.
Comegys, 500 A.2d 611 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Jenkins, 370 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Karasawa v. TIG Ins. Co., 961 P.2d
1171 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998); Greenawalt v. State Farm Ins. Co., 569 N.E.2d 154 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991); Rice v. Meridian Ins. Co., 751 N.E.2d 685 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Hinners v.
Pekin Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 345 (Iowa 1988); Hines v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 504
A.2d 632 (Md. 1986); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Haney, 220 N.W.2d 728 (Mich. Ct. App.
1974); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Galloway, 354 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984); Rand v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. DV-03-312, 2005 Mont. Dist. LEXIS
1056 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Mar. 4, 2005); Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Action Elec. Co., 593
N.W.2d 275 (Neb. 1999); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Neb., 583
N.W.2d 358 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998); Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 901
(N.M. 2003); White v. Ramirez, 607 N.Y.S.2d 594 (App. Div. 1994); Graham v.
2009]
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uninsured motorist coverage provides an insured with the means to
collect damages to which he is legally entitled to for bodily injury,
disease, or sickness, including death, caused by an accident arising out of
the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.9
Uninsured motorist coverage seeks to pay the insured for losses he is
legally entitled to collect as damages for bodily injury from a culpable
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.' 0
Uninsured motorist coverage is frequently described as personal and
portable. Pursuant to this principle, insureds are covered for injuries
caused by an uninsured motorist without regards to an insured
automobile. According to the principle of portability, because the
uninsured motorist coverage follows a person and not a vehicle, it must
provide protection under all circumstances, regardless of whether the
individual is in a motor vehicle, on a horse, walking, or relaxing on the
front porch when injured by an uninsured motorist. 1 In other words,
Travelers Ins. Co., 61 P.3d 225 (Okla. 2002); Babcock v. Adkins, 695 P.2d 1340 (Okla.
1984); Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co., 513 A.2d 1051 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Am. Family
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 454 N.W.2d 555 (S.D. 1990); Hamaker v. Am. States Ins. Co. of
Tex., 493 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 586
N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 1998).
9. See supra notes 4-5. A few uninsured motorist statutes recognize the right to
recover for property damage as well as personal injury. See ALASKA STAT. §
28.20.440(b)(3) (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-404 (Supp. 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
18, § 3902(a) (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-2406(a)(1)(D), (f)(2) (LexisNexis Supp.
2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-7-11(a)(1) (Supp. 2008); RAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-
301(a)(2) (2005); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/143a(2) (West Supp. 2008); IND. CODE
ANN. § 27-7-5-2(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-11-101(2) (1999); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1(a)(2) (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301(C) (West 2003);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (Supp. 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)
(LexisNexis 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2.1(a) (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-
150(A) (2002); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1952.101(a) (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. §
3 1A-22-305.5 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(A) (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
48.22.030(2) (LexisNexis 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-3 1(a) (LexisNexis 2006).
10. Kral v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 784 P.2d 759 (Colo. 1989).
11. Peachtree Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharpton, 768 So. 2d 368 (Ala. 2000); Higgins v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 770 P.2d 324 (Ariz. 1989); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Progressive Marathon Ins. Co., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 478 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2007);
DeHerrera v. Sentry Ins. Co., 30 P.3d 167 (Colo. 2001); Ruggiero v. Montgomery Mut.
Ins. Co., No. 03C-04-022 ESB, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS 207 (Del. Super. Ct. June 28,
2004); Coleman v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 517 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1988); Rampley v. Doe,
347 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); Lee v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 762 P.2d 809 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1988); Shefner v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 611 N.E.2d 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Ind.
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Speer, 407 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Homick v. Owners
Ins. Co., 511 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 1993); Kan. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Cool, 471 P.2d 352
(Kan. 1970); Hamilton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 789 S.W.2d 751 (Ky. 1990); Md. Auto. Ins.
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uninsured motorist coverage is not dependent on the insured being
injured in connection with a vehicle which is covered by a liability
insurer against whom recovery is being sought. While uninsured
motorist coverage is conditioned on the existence of an underlying
liability policy, the insured seeking uninsured motorist benefits need not
have liability coverage in all events and for all purposes. 12 The principle
of portability is a policy concept pursuant to which insurance exclusions,
conditions, or limitations that restrict or preclude uninsured motorist
coverage are evaluated for purposes of determining their validity. 3
The principle of portability is by no means absolute. Not all
contractual restraints on uninsured motorist coverage are invalid. For
example, in Blazekovic v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,' 4 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin was called upon to determine whether a
"drive other car" exclusion was a valid uninsured motorist exclusion.
15
According to the court, the issue was one of statutory interpretation that
turned upon "the language of Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(e), which
states that '[a] policy may provide for exclusions not prohibited by sub.
(6) or other applicable law."",16 In light of the statutory language, the
court in Blazekovic employed a two-part analysis.' 7 The first part
consisted of an examination of whether the exclusion came within "the
description of any of the enumerated prohibitions" in the uninsured
motorist statute. 18 "If it does, the matter is resolved, and the exclusion is
Fund v. Erie Ins. Exch., 660 A.2d 929 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); Sister Thatil v. Dom.
Sisters of Charity of Presnt'n of the Blessed Virgin, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1993);
Madar v. League Gen. Ins. Co., 394 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Gudvangen v.
Austin Mut. Ins. Co., 284 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. 1978); Gibbs v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., 938
S.W.2d 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Jacobson v. Implement Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 640 P.2d
908 (Mont. 1982); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mabe, 444 S.E.2d 664 (N.C. Ct. App.
1994); Bray v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 445 S.E.2d 79 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994);
Murfield v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 84-CA-30, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 7668 (Ohio Ct.
App. Apr. 6, 1985); Cothren v. Emcasco Ins. Co., 555 P.2d 1037 (Okla. 1976);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Erwood, 611 S.E.2d 319 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005); Dupree v.
Doe, 772 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Grange Ins. Ass'n v. Hubbard, 667 P.2d
121 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983); Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 717 N.W.2d 258 (Wis.
2006).
12. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 462 So. 2d 346 (Ala. 1984).
13. See cases cited supra note 11.
14. Blazekovic v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 610 N.W.2d 467 (Wis. 2000).
15. Id. at 468.
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invalid." 19 If the exclusion does not fit an enumerated prohibition, the
analysis proceeds to the second part of the test, which consists of an
examination of "any 'other applicable law' that may prohibit the
exclusion., 20  "Absent any other applicable law prohibiting the
exclusion, it remains valid.",
21
The Blazekovic court found the exclusions did "not fall under [one
of] the enumerated exclusions prohibited under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6);"
thus the court proceeded to the second prong of the test and examined
whether the exclusion was prohibited by "other applicable law.
' 22
According to the insured, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) represented the other
law prohibiting the exclusion.23 In essence, Blazekovic argued that this
statutory provision was "unambiguous and permit[ted] 'drive other car'
exclusions only when all [of its] requirements [were] satisfied. 2 4 In
resolving the issue before it, the Blazekovic court, observed that Wis.
Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) had "replaced the broad proposition... that
uninsured motorist coverage is available in all circumstances. 5 In
essence, the statute allows such exclusions only when a specific set of
required conditions had been satisfied. As observed by the court,
"[i]nstead, the legislature engrafted a permissible 'drive other car'
exclusion that must comply with three specific requirements. This
reflects the legislative intent to prohibit restrictions of uninsured motorist
coverage except in a singular set of circumstances. 26
The validity of an exclusion that restricts the portability of uninsured
motorist coverage was also addressed by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Burstein v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance
Co.27 Therein, the injured parties were driving a company car, which did
not have underinsured motorist coverage, when they were struck by a
speeding motorcyclist.28 The motorcyclist's policy did not cover all of
their injuries.2 9  Therefore, the injured parties sought underinsured
motorist coverage from the insurer of their three personal vehicles, which
19. Id.




24. Id. at 471.
25. Id. at 472.
26. Id. at 473.
27. Burstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. (Burstein 1), 809 A.2d 204 (Pa. 2002).




were not involved in the accident.3° The insurer denied coverage on the
basis of the "regularly used, non-owned car exclusion.",31 The trial court
concluded that the exclusion was void because: "(1) Pennsylvania's
Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law... should be construed to
provide the greatest possible coverage to injured claimants; (2) providing
UIM [underinsured motorist] coverage is in the public's best interest; and
(3) UIM coverage is first-party coverage and therefore 'follows the
person, not the vehicle."'' 32 Thus, according to the trial court, "voiding
the exclusion 'furthers the aforementioned public policies by providing
the greatest possible coverage to the [Bursteins]." 33
In Burstein, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court formulated the
dispositive issue as "whether the regularly used, non-owned car
exclusion and its contractual restraint on UIM portability violate[d] a
clearly expressed public policy. '34 Unlike the approach employed in
Blazekovic, which concentrated on the statutory language,35 a pure public
policy approach looks beyond the language of the statute and focuses on
the underlying legislative purpose for enacting the statute. In Burstein,
the court acknowledged that "the enactment of the MVFRL [Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law] reflected a legislative concern for
the spiralling consumer cost of automobile insurance and the resultant
increase in the number of uninsured motorists driving on public
highways. ' 36 The effect of voiding the exclusion would thus frustrate the
dominant and overarching public policy underlying the MVFRL by
compelling insurers to underwrite unknown risks that they had not been
compensated to insure.37 Relying on public policy, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the state's uninsured motorist
law contemplated that uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage
may be portable in some instances.38 This view of the role of the
principle of portability in determining the validity of a policy exclusion,
restriction, or condition reflects a reversal in fortunes, in that, the
exclusion is assumed valid until proven otherwise. Uninsured motorist
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 206 (quoting Burstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. (Burstein II), 742
A.2d 684, 686 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)).
33. Id. (quoting Burstein I, 742 A.2d at 688).
34. Id. at 209.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 207.
37. Id. at 208.
38. Id. at 209 n.7, 210 n.8.
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coverage requires reimbursement to the insured by his own carrier for the
type of loss set out in the uninsured motorist statute that would have been
covered by an automobile liability policy had the uninsured motorist
been insured.39 The overarching purpose of uninsured motorist laws is to
fill gaps in compulsory insurance plans by providing the same protection
to a person injured by an uninsured motorist as would have been
available had the tortfeasor been insured.4 ° In this context, gap coverage
represents an expression of the legislative intent that uninsured motorist
coverage provide compensation and fill the gap to the extent of its
monetary limits for the benefit of the insured motorist, who has
purchased uninsured motorist coverage, and cannot be made whole
because of the financial irresponsibility of the tortfeasor.41  In
jurisdictions that have adopted the gap coverage theory,
an insured is allowed to recover under his UM coverage only if
the tortfeasor's policy limit is less than the injured insured's UM
policy limit. For example, if an injured insured has $100,000 in
damages, the tortfeasor has a $10,000 policy limit, and the
injured insured's UM policy limit is[]$50,000, the insured can
collect only $40,000 from his UM carrier. But if the tortfeasor
has $75,000 in coverage the insured can collect nothing from his
UM carrier. This is so because there is no "gap," as the
tortfeasor's $75,000 policy limit exceeds the UM carrier's
39. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Marathon Ins. Co., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d
478 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2007); McKenzie v. Dattco, Inc., No. CV970541370S, 2001
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1618 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 11, 2001); Goodman v. Am. Cas. Co.,
643 N.E.2d 432 (Mass. 1994).
40. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 286 So. 2d 302 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973);
Lowing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 859 P.2d 724 (Ariz. 1993); Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto.
Club of S. Cal. v. Alcivar, 156 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Ct. App. 1979); Jeanes v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 532 A.2d 595 (Del. Ch. 1987); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Royston, 817 P.2d
118 (Haw. 1991); Banes v. W. States Ins. Co., 616 N.E.2d 1021 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Petersen, 679 N.W.2d 571 (Iowa 2004); Thomas v. Am. Family
Mut. Ins. Co., 485 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1992); Forrester v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
517 P.2d 173 (Kan. 1973); Legassie v. Deane, No. CV-96-410, 1999 Me. Super. LEXIS
80 (Me. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 1999); Heavens v. Laclede Gas Co., 755 S.W.2d 331 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1988); Dakota Fire Ins. Co. v. Oie, 968 P.2d 1126 (Mont. 1998); McCaffery v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 236 A.2d 490 (N.H. 1967); Riccio v. Prudential Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 717 (N.J. 1987); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Godwin, 361 N.Y.S.2d
461 (App. Div. 1974); Autry v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 242 S.E.2d 172 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1978); DeCoteau v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 603 N.W.2d 906 (N.D. 2000); Clark v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 577 N.W.2d 790 (Wis. 1998).
41. See Sec. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Hand, 107 Cal. Rptr. 439 (Ct. App. 1973).
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$50,000 policy limit. In short, in "gap" states unless the
tortfeasor's policy limit is less than the UM carrier's policy limit,
the UM carrier is exempted from payment as a matter of law.42
The gap rationale provides the conceptual basis for two general types
of uninsured motorist statutes: minimum liability/limited recovery
statutes and full/broad recovery statutes. The majority of jurisdictions
have "minimum liability" statutes, which are intended to protect injured
insured motorists by guaranteeing that they will be able to recover at
least an amount equivalent to what would have been available had the
insured been injured by a driver who maintained the required statutory
43
minimum liability coverage. A minimum liability or limited coverage
statute "allows the insured.. . to collect damages only up to [the]
statutory minimum[,] notwithstanding the actual damages. ' 4  "[A]ll
sums collected [are] credited towards reaching the statutory minimum.
45
Full or broad recovery statutes attempt to better compensate insureds
for their actual damages. They allow the insured to recover up to the
policy limits so long as the sum of the insured's recovery under the
uninsured motorist coverage and any other payment does not exceed the
insured's actual damages. 46 Full recovery statutes are typically construed
42. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Pac. Indem. Co., 115 P.3d 856, 859 (Okla. 2005);
see also Webb v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 605 A.2d 1344 (Vt. 1992).
43. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jones, 243 So. 2d 736 (Ala. 1970);
Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club of S. Cal. v. Alcivar, 156 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Ct. App.
1979); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 852 P.2d 459 (Colo. 1993); Palisbo v.
Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 547 P.2d 1350 (Haw. 1976); Luechtefeld v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
656 N.E.2d 1058 (Ill. 1995); Thomas v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 485 N.W.2d 298
(Iowa 1992); McClure v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 238 N.W.2d 321 (Iowa 1976);
Powell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 585 A.2d 286 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991);
Bullock v. Commerce Ins. Co., No. 91-08804, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 630 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 1996); Am. Standard Ins. Co. ofWis. v. Bracht, 103 S.W.3d 281 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2003); Rowe v. Travelers Indem. Co., 800 P.2d 157 (Mont. 1990); Poper v.
Rollins, 90 S.W.3d 682 (Term. 2002).
44. Poper v. Rollins, 90 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tenn. 2002). See cases cited supra note
40.
45. Poper, 90 S.W.3d at 686.
46. See, e.g., Progressive Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 953 P.2d 510 (Alaska 1998); Mass v.
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 610 A.2d 1185 (Conn. 1992); Hurst v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
652 A.2d 10 (Del. 1995); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Williams, 167 S.E.2d 174 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1969); United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Deprizio, 705 N.E.2d 455 (Ind. 1999); O'Donoghue
v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 66 P.3d 822 (Kan. 2003); Babineaux v. Domingue, 529
So. 2d 45 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Legassie v. Deane, No. CV-96-410, 1999 Me. Super.
LEXIS 80 (Me. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 1999); Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43
(Minn. 1978); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Wilkinson, 569 A.2d 749 (N.H. 1989); Sloan
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to prohibit offsets that limit or restrict the insured's full damage
recovery.47 The insured's coverage, in a sense, is in excess and above
that of the tortfeasor's, subject only to the actual damages suffered.48
Whether a particular statute is minimum liability or full recovery
boils down to a matter of legislative intent as determined by the court
from the purpose of the statute. For example, the Supreme Court of
Colorado in Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Thompson49 observed that:
"The legislative 'declaration of purpose' to the uninsured
motorist statute, 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 17-12-20,
expresses no intention to require full indemnification from all
insurers of uninsured motorist victims. Rather, the express[ed]
intent [was] 'to induce and encourage' all motorists to provide
for their financial responsibility for the protection of others from
financially irresponsible uninsured motorists. Had the legislature
intended full indemnification it would not have granted the
option of totally rejecting the uninsured motorist coverage."5°
"The purpose of the uninsured motorist coverage mandated by
section 10-4-609 is to compensate an innocent insured for loss,
subject to the insured's policy limits, caused by financially
irresponsible motorists. The legislative intent is satisfied by
coverage that compensates a person injured by an uninsured
motorist to the same extent as one injured by a motorist who is
insured in compliance with the law. Section 10-4-609 does not
require full indemnification of losses suffered at the hands of
uninsured motorists under all circumstances.
' 51
Uninsured motorist statutes typically provide one of four options
regarding the amount of coverage: (1) it is restricted to the statutory
minimum for death or bodily injury prescribed by law; (2) it may not be
less than the minimum limits of bodily injury liability coverage required
v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 519 P.2d 301 (N.M. 1974).
47. See cases cited supra note 46.
48. See Progressive Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 953 P.2d 510 (Alaska 1998).
49. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 852 P.2d 459 (Colo. 1993).
50. Id. at 464 (quoting Alliance Mut. Cas. Co. v. Duerson, 518 P.2d 1177, 1180
(Colo. 1974)).
51. Id. at 466 (quoting Terranova v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 800 P.2d 58, 61
(Colo. 1990)) (citations omitted).
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by law; (3) it must be equal to the limits of bodily injury liability
coverage in the policy; or (4) it is restricted to the statutory minimum for
death or bodily injury provided by law, but coverage may be purchased
in limits up to the amount of the bodily injury coverage of the policy.
Courts that have adopted the minimum liability view seemed to be
influenced by statutory language that restricts uninsured motorist
coverage to the minimum coverage required by law-i.e. option (1).52
Courts that have adopted the full recovery view were typically influenced
by statutory language that required the insurer to provide coverage in an
amount equal to or not less than the limits of bodily injury liability
provided in the policy-i.e., options (2) and (3).53 Full-recovery
uninsured motorist statutes, subject to statutory exceptions allowing set-
off and prohibiting duplicate recovery, allow the insured the same
recovery that would have been available to her had the tortfeasor been
insured to the same extent as the insured herself.
54
Uninsured motorist statutes that require vehicle owners to obtain the
minimum coverage required by law but provide an option to select and
purchase the amount of uninsured motorist coverage desired up to the
bodily injury liability limits of the policy are also generally classified as
full recovery. 55 Language of this sort, in effect, allows an insured to
increase his uninsured motorist coverage to any amount and thus choose
the maximum limit of protection. Uninsured motorist coverage is, in
effect, a substitute for the insurance the tortfeasor should have had.
Some courts attribute less significance to the option to purchase
limits of uninsured motorist coverage in excess of the mandatory
52. See, e.g., Hackett v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-cv-00521-REB-BNB, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16262 (D. Colo. Mar. 6, 2007); Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Howe, 488 So. 2d 917
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); S. Am. Ins. Co. v. Dobson, 441 So. 2d 1185 (La. 1983); Rowe
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 800 P.2d 157 (Mont. 1990); Kromer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 677
A.2d 1224 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); Poper v. Rollins, 90 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2002).
53. See, e.g., Mass v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 610 A.2d 1185 (Conn. 1992); S. Am. Ins.
Co. v. Dobson, 441 So. 2d 1185 (La. 1983); Rowe v. Travelers Indem. Co., 800 P.2d 157
(Mont. 1990); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Wilkinson, 569 A.2d 749 (N.H. 1989);
Kromer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 677 A.2d 1224 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
54. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 370 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979).
55. See, e.g., Spain v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 84 (Ariz. 1986) (full recovery);
Hackett v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-cv-00521-REB-BNB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16262
(D. Colo. Mar. 6, 2007); Mass v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 610 A.2d 1185 (Conn. 1992)
(full recovery); Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1978) (full recovery);
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Wilkinson, 569 A.2d 749 (N.H. 1989) (full recovery).
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minimum. 56 For example, in Hackett v. Allstate Insurance Co.,57 the
court disagreed with the conclusion that a statute, which provides an
insured with the option to purchase additional uninsured motorist
protection should be classified as full recovery. 58 As observed by the
court,
[i]t appears plaintiffs may be operating under the impression
that, because Colorado's UM statute further requires that
insureds must be offered the opportunity to purchase additional
insurance up to the bodily injury liability limits of the policy or $
100,000 per person and $ 300,000 per accident, whichever is
less, the Colorado statute is a full coverage statute. This
argument confuses two separate issues. Although section 10-4-
609 (2) requires the insurer to offer higher limits of UM
coverage, the insured is not required to maintain coverage higher
56. See, e.g., Mann v. Farmers Ins. Co., 761 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1988). The Oklahoma
Supreme Court has not expressly classified Oklahoma's uninsured motorist statute as
either minimum liability or full recovery. Nevertheless,
This Court has stated that the intent of the uninsured motorist legislation is
to afford to one insured under his own liability insurance policy the same
protection in the event he is injured by an uninsured motorist as he would have
had if the negligent motorist had carried liability insurance. In subsection (B)
of section 3636, it is provided that the uninsured motorist coverage provided as
a part of a liability policy shall not be less than that required under 47 O.S.
1981 § 7-204, with the insured to have the option to purchase increased limits
of liability not to exceed the limits provided for bodily injury under the policy.
Section 7-204 sets the minimum limits of liability coverage required to be
carried by all owners of vehicles registered in the State of Oklahoma.
The purpose of the uninsured motorist provision, when viewed in light of
the requirement that it provide minimum standards of protection, is that it
place[s] the insured in the same position he would have been in if the negligent
uninsured motorist had complied with Oklahoma laws concerning financial
responsibility. To find it applicable to supplemental liability policies, as argued
by plaintiff as her interpretation of the "[n]o policy insuring against loss..."
language, would place one injured by an uninsured motorist in the same
position as if the uninsured motorist had carried the same liability coverage as
the injured party.
Moser v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 406, 408 (Okla. 1986) (footnotes omitted). This
language strongly suggests that Oklahoma's uninsured motorist law is minimum liability.
See also Gray v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 560 (Okla. 1996) (amount of uninsured
motorist coverage may not exceed liability; the amount of uninsured motorist coverage
that will be imputed as a matter of law is the statutory minimum).
57. Hackett v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-cv-00521-REB-BNB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16262 (D. Colo. Mar. 6,2007).
58. See id. at *9.
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than that prescribed under section 10-4-609 (1). The fact that the
insured can reject even the minimum level of UM coverage all
together lends further credence to the conclusion that Colorado's
UM statute is a minimum recovery statute.59
The practical effect of an uninsured motorist statute's classification
as minimum liability or full recovery on the insured's recovery can be
quite significant. For example, in Palisbo v. Hawaiian Insurance &
Guaranty Co.,60 the Hawaii Supreme Court was asked to calculate an
insured's entitlement from its uninsured motorist carrier after receiving a
recovery from the tortfeasor's liability carrier.6' Palisbo involved a car
owned by Damasco Clemente, which was being driven by his son, Glen
62Clemente, a minor. As a result of Glen's negligence, the car he was
driving
struck a guy wire supporting a telephone pole and was wrecked.
Glen Clemente, Kurt Bruhn, and Markam Palisbo were all
injured in varying degrees, while Neal Ramos and Richard
Muneoka were killed.
Markam F. Palisbo filed suit against Glen Clemente and his
parents, for the injuries he sustained... and was awarded
judgment in the [amount] of $30,000 .... [The] parents of Neal
Ramos... filed suit against the same defendants for the death of
their son, and obtained judgment in the [amount] of $42,027.21.
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company [insured the car]
driven by Glen .... under [a] ... policy with bodily injury limits
of liability of $10,000 per person and ... $20,000 per accident.63
State Farm deposited the $20,000 per accident limits with the court and
requested it to prorate the funds among the parties entitled thereto.
64
The trial court did so by allocating $6,000 to Markam Palisbo,
$6,500 to Michael M. Ramos and Carol T. Ramos, and the
balance to Kurt Bruhn and the survivors of Richard Muneoka.
59. Id. (citations omitted).
60. Palisbo v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 547 P.2d 1350 (Haw. 1976).
61. Id. at 1352-53.
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At the time of the accident, Markam Palisbo was covered by a
policy of insurance issued by Hawaiian Insurance & Guaranty
Company, [Ltd.] containing an uninsured motorist provision
which [obligated] the.., company to pay "all sums which the
insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to
recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured."
Neal Ramos and his parents were insured under a similar policy
by Government Employees Insurance Company. Both policies
[contained a 10/20 limit].
Palisbo and the parents... of Neal Ramos [filed suit] against
their respective insur[ers], each seeking the maximum amount of
$10,000, under their "uninsured motorist" policies. The
defendant insurance companies denied liability.... The trial
court denied the insurance companies' motions [for summary
judgment]... [and] ... awarded $4,000 to Plaintiff Palisbo, and
$3,500 to Plaintiffs Ramos. These amounts represented.., the
difference between the sum received from the [tortfeasor's]
insur[er] and [their respective] uninsured.., policy limit of
$10,000.... From these judgments the plaintiffs appeal[ed].65
On appeal, "[t]he plaintiffs [argued] ... that they [were] entitled to
the full face value of their respective policies, in addition to the amount
they [had] received [from] the tortfeasor's [carrier]. 66 The Supreme
Court of Hawaii disagreed, concluding that "[r]ecovery by the plaintiffs
under both the tortfeasor's policy and their respective uninsured motorist
policies is limited to the minimum amounts specified in the financial
responsibility law., 67 According to the court, "[c]overage in excess of
those minimum amounts must be the direct result of contractual
arrangements between the parties. 68
In Legassie v. Deane,69 Robert Legassie sustained personal injuries
for which the tortfeasor's, William Deane, automobile liability policy
would provide benefits of $100,000.70 Legassie was also insured under a
65. Id. at 1352-53.
66. Id. at 1354.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1354-55.





$1,000,000 underinsured motorist policy provided by his employer
through a policy with Royal Insurance Company.71 Because Legassie's
injuries were work-related, he received worker's compensation benefits
in excess of $460,000.72 Royal's policy contained two provisions which,
if valid, would reduce any potential underinsured motorist liability to the
insured under the policy. 73 The first provision provided for an exception
to coverage which would relieve the carrier of liability to the extent of
any workers' compensation benefits paid to the insured.74 The second
provision "constitute[d] an offset or limitation on Royal's liability. 75
"[T]he contract provide[d] that 'any amount payable under this [policy]
shall be reduced by... all sums paid or payable under any workers'
compensation, disability benefits or similar law .... ,,, Legassie had
received in excess of $460,000 in workers' compensation benefits, as a
result, the contractual provision, if enforceable, would reduce Royal's
obligation from $900,000, the difference between the tortfeasor's
coverage and Royal's uninsured motorist coverage, to roughly
$440,000. 7' Thus, as a consequence of continued receipt of workers'
compensation benefits, Legassie would be faced with "the prospect of
surrendering his claim to all ... remaining benefits under" Royal's
policy.78 Royal conceded, however, "that regardless of the effect of this
offset [provision], it remain[ed] liable for the minimum levels of
[uninsured motorist] coverage required by [law], namely, $ 20,000 per
person and a maximum of $ 40,000 per accident.9 79
According to the court in Legassie,
[t]he first stage of [the] analysis calls for consideration of the
purpose of the statute:
The dominant purpose of the mandatory uninsured vehicle
coverage statute is to provide to the insured victim of an
accident a source for the collection of "all sums which the
victim is legally entitled to recover as damages against the
71. Id.
72. Id. at *2.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *2-3.






Oklahoma City University Law Review
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle["].... In
extending the law to require underinsured as well as
uninsured motorist coverage, the legislature "intended to
permit the insured injured person the same recovery which
would have been available to him had the tortfeasor been
insured to the same extent as the injured party.' 80
"[A]pplication of the worker's compensation [benefit] offset [to the
uninsured motorist] contract would deprive Legassie of at least part of
[the] recovery to which he [was] entitled [to recover] from the
tortfeasor. ' '81 "If the tortfeasor were as fully insured as Legassie,
Legassie would stand to recover up to $ 1,000,000 for his injuries. 82
However, because the tortfeasor had only $100,000 in coverage, Royal
was statutorily required to provide Legassie with an additional $900,000
in coverage.83 As observed by the court, "[i]f Legassie's underinsured
motorist coverage were reduced by the amount of worker's
compensation benefits he has received, Royal would fall short of its
statutory obligation to ensure that this policy provide Legassie with the
same recovery he would have had if the tortfeasor had $ 1,000,000 in
automobile liability coverage."
84
Uninsured motorist insurance does not insure the uninsured
motorist. 85 "It is a contractual liability [created] by statute between [an
80. Id. at *8 (quoting Tibbetts v. Me. Bonding & Cas. Co., 618 A.2d 731, 733-34
(Me. 1992)).




85. Riccio v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 717, 719 (N.J. 1987); see
also Hettel v. Rye, 475 S.W.2d 536 (Ark. 1972); Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 207
So. 2d 925 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Hull v. Town of Plymouth, 724 A.2d 1291 (N.H. 1999);
Hendren v. Allstate Ins. Co., 672 P.2d 1137 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Distelhorst v. Great
Am. Ins. Co., No. 86AP-1167, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 10058 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 10,
1987); Thompson v. Parker, 606 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); Maxey v. Doe, 225
S.E.2d 359 (Va. 1976); Employers Health Ins. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 469 N.W.2d 172
(Wis. 1991). States are divided into two groups regarding whether the uninsured motorist
carrier of the insured stands in the shoes of the tortfeasor and can raise and assert any
defenses the uninsured motorist could assert. For those states that hold in the affirmative
see State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 470 So. 2d 1230 (Ala. 1985); Cincinnati Ins.
Co. v. Samples, 192 S.W.3d 311 (Ky. 2006) (does for purpose of paying damages);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 436 A.2d 465 (Md. 1981); Lane v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 308 N.W.2d 503 (Neb. 1981); Hendren v. Allstate Ins. Co., 672 P.2d 1137
(N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Daniels v. Hetrick, 595 S.E.2d 700 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); State
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insurer and its insured] and inures solely to the benefit of the insured., 86
Its protection is restricted to those persons falling within the statutory
87
or policy definition of insured.88
Uninsured motorist statutes are remedial in nature and liberally
construed in order to effectuate the legislative purpose of protecting
persons who are wrongfully injured in automobile accidents from losses
that, because of the tortfeasor's lack of liability coverage, would
otherwise go uncompensated. 89  Consequently, it is universally
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gillette, 641 N.W.2d 662 (Wis. 2002) (cannot take
advantage of all defenses of uninsured motorist); but see Cooper v. Aplin, 523 So. 2d 339
(Ala. 1988); Voland v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 943 P.2d 808 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997);
Anderson v. Peerless Ins. Co., No. 66861, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 337 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Feb. 3, 1993); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Candreva, 497 So. 2d 980 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986); J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 253 S.E.2d 878 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979);
Wineinger v. Ellis, 855 N.E.2d 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Dalton v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., No. 65,979, 1991 Kan. App. LEXIS 865 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991);
Barry v. Keith, 474 S.W.2d 876 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971) (allowing intervention to assert
defenses); Rand v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. DV-03-312, 2005 Mont. Dist.
LEXIS 1056 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Mar. 4, 2005); Fetch v. Quam, 530 N.W.2d 337 (N.D.
1995); Boris v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Chatterton v.
Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997); Romanick v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 795 P.2d 728
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990); State ex rel State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Canady, 475
S.E.2d 107 (W. Va. 1996). For those states holding in the negative see Benzer v. Iowa
Mut. Tornado Ins. Ass'n, 216 N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 1974); Suchy v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co.,
574 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); Bill Hodges Truck Co. v. Humphrey, 704 P.2d 94
(Okla. Civ. App. 1984); compare Briggs v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 859
(Colo. Ct. App. 1992), with Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Indust. Accident Comm'n, 38
Cal. Rptr. 336 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Parsons v. Allstate Ins. Co., 165 P.3d 809 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2006) (allowing assertion of defenses uninsured motorist failed to raise); Kent v.
Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 844 A.2d 1092 (Del. Super. Ct. 2004); Evans v.
Stuard, No. 87C-SE-22, 1989 Del. Super. LEXIS 521 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 1989);
Murphy v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 458 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Gremillion v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 302 So. 2d 712 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Medders v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co., 623 So. 2d 979 (Miss. 1993); Barker v. Palmarin, 799 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990); Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. McKinley, No. 53934, 1988 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3142 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1988); Thaxton v. Travelers Indem. Co., 555 S.W.2d
718 (Tenn. 1977); Bobbitt v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio, 161 S.E.2d 671 (Va.
1968).
86. Riccio v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 717, 719 (N.J. 1987)
(quoting Senn v. J.S. Weeks & Co., 180 S.E.2d 336, 339 (S.C. 1971)).
87. See CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(b) (West 2005); MIss. CODE ANN. § 83-11-103
(2000).
88. Mundey v. Erie Ins. Group, 914 A.2d 1167 (Md. 2007); Peterzell v. Gen. Ins. Co.
of Am., No. CV95-32-68-70-S, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1946 (Conn. Super. Ct. July
22, 1996).
89. Criterion Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 347 So. 2d 384 (Ala. 1977); Hillman v.
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 1248 (Alaska 1988); Stuart v. Ins. Co. of N.
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recognized that any restriction on coverage must comport with the
purpose and intent of the uninsured motorist statute. Policy conditions,
restrictions, or limitations that are inconsistent with the statute's
requirements are unenforceable as a matter of public policy.90
Am., 730 P.2d 255 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Oanh Thi Pham v. Allstate Ins. Co., 254 Cal.
Rptr. 152 (Ct. App. 1988); Grissom v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 599 A.2d 1086 (Del.
Ch. 1991); Smith v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 268 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1980);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaneshiro, 998 P.2d 490 (Haw. 2000); Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Speer, 407 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Stewart v. Capps, 802 P.2d 1226 (Kan.
1990); Simon v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1986); Wescott v. Allstate Ins.,
397 A.2d 156 (Me. 1979); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. DeHaan, 900 A.2d 208 (Md.
2006); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mercurio, 535 N.E.2d 234 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989);
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Haney, 220 N.W.2d 728 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974); Miklas v. Parrott,
684 N.W.2d 458 (Minn. 2004); Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Payne, 603 So. 2d 343 (Miss. 1992);
Mitchell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 703 (Mont. 2003); Shaw v. City of Jersey City,
811 A.2d 404 (N.J. 2002); Rowell v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 571 N.E.2d 707 (N.Y. 1991);
Hoffman v. Great Am. Alliance Ins. Co., 601 S.E.2d 908 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); Thedin v.
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d 703 (N.D. 1994); Stanton v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 623 N.E.2d 1197 (Ohio 1993); Forbes v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 904 P.2d 159
(Okla. Civ. App. 1995); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Erwood, 611 S.E.2d 319 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2005); Guarantee Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Boggs, 527 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975);
Hubbard v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 944 A.2d 891 (Vt. 2007); Hodges v. Perry, 43
Va. Cir. 340 (Cir. Ct. 1997); Plymale v. Adkins, 429 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1993).
90. Essick v. Barksdale, 882 F. Supp. 365 (D. Del. 1995); Walker v. GuideOne
Specialty Mut. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 769 (Ala. 2002); Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v.
McKeon, 765 P.2d 513 (Ariz. 1988); Pardon v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 868
S.W.2d 468 (Ark. 1994); Daun v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 44 (Ct. App.
2005); DeHerrera v. Sentry Ins. Co., 30 P.3d 167 (Colo. 2001); Gormbard v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 904 A.2d 198 (Conn. 2006); First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Devine, 211 So. 2d 587
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Olson, 751 P.2d 666 (Haw. 1988);
Moses v. Coronet Ins. Co., 549 N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Jackson v. Jones, 804
N.E.2d 155 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Lee v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 646 N.W.2d 403
(Iowa 2002); Stewart v. Capps, 802 P.2d 1226 (Kan. 1990); Nail v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 406 So. 2d 216 (La. 1981); Flanagan v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., No. CV-
03-001, 2003 Me. Super. LEXIS 207 (Me. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2003); Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Webb, 436 A.2d 465 (Md. 1981); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mercurio,
535 N.E.2d 234 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989); Citizens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jenks, 194 N.W.2d 728
(Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Marchio v. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 747 N.W.2d 376 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2008); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636 So. 2d 658 (Miss. 1994);
Thornburg v. Farmers Ins. Co., 859 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Oberkramer v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 650 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Guiberson v. Hartford Cas. Ins.
Co., 704 P.2d 68 (Mont. 1985); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hildebrand, 502
N.W.2d 469 (Neb. 1993); Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 96 P.3d 747 (Nev. 2004); Peerless
Ins. Co. v. Vigue, 345 A.2d 399 (N.H. 1975); Mozee v. McGhee, 410 A.2d 46 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 901 (N.M.
2003); Brittain v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., No. 77440, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS
5100 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2000); State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Greer, 777 P.2d 941
(Okla. 1989); London v. Farmers Ins. Co., 63 P.3d 552 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002); Utica
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Contrisciane, 473 A.2d 1005 (Pa. 1984); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
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II. ELEMENTS OF AN UNINSURED MOTORIST CLAIM
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has expressly renounced the gap
coverage theory.91  This decision neither restricts nor broadens the
court's discretion in interpreting the uninsured motorist statute. It merely
leaves the court with one less layer of onion to peel when construing the
public policy dictates of the Oklahoma Uninsured Motorist Act.
In Oklahoma, uninsured motorist coverage is mandatory in the sense
that it must be offered in writing by the insurer and rejected in writing by
the named insured.92  The insurer's statutory obligation to offer
uninsured motorist coverage extends only to the statutory minimum
93
amount of coverage. If neither offered in writing by the insurer, nor
rejected in writing by all named insureds94 or consumer/lessees, 95 the
statutory minimum amount of coverage is imputed by operation of law
into the policy.
96
Three of the four requirements for determining whether an individual
is entitled to uninsured motorist benefits emanate from the Oklahoma
Uninsured Motorist Act.97 The remaining requirement is contractual in
Viti, 850 A.2d 104 (R.I. 2004); Grange Ins. Ass'n v. Hubbard, 667 P.2d 121 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1983); Mitchell v. Broadnax, 537 S.E.2d 882 (W. Va. 2000).
91. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Pac. Indem. Co., 115 P.3d 856, 859 (Okla. 2005).
92. See Boerstler v. Hoover, 943 P.2d 614 (Okla. 1997); May v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 918 P.2d 43 (Okla. 1996); Robertson v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 836
P.2d 1294 (Okla. 1992); Moon v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1331 (Okla. 1988).
93. Cofer v. Morton, 784 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1989).
[U]nless a named insured or applicant requests such coverage in writing, such
coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to any renewal,
reinstatement, substitute, amended or replacement policy where a named
insured or applicant had rejected the coverage in connection with a policy
previously issued to him by the insurer.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636(G) (Supp. 2008). The coverage must be re-offered, however,
where a new vehicle is added to the policy. Beauchamp v. Sw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 746 P.2d
673 (Okla. 1987). The statute "does not require that every [car] ... in [a single] policy
have a separate document that separately accepts or rejects [uninsured motorist] coverage
for that [specific] vehicle." Graham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 61 P.3d 225, 230 (Okla. 2002).
94. Plaster v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 791 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1989) (individual
named insured who signed rejection cannot assert a claim for uninsured motorist
proceeds).
95. Moon v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1331 (Okla. 1988) (rental company's
rejection of uninsured motorist coverage did not constitute rejection by lessee); Sexton v.
Cont'l Cas. Co., 816 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1991).
96. May v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 918 P.2d 43 (Okla. 1996).
97. Uninsured motorist coverage is a creature of statute. Therefore, "'the provisions
of [the] statutes are given force and effect as if written into the policy."' Gray v. Midland
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nature; however, it is subject to the same policy considerations attributed
to the three statutory requirements. The statute in pertinent part provides
that:
A. No policy insuring against loss resulting from liability
imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle shall be issued, delivered, renewed, or extended in this
state with respect to a motor vehicle registered or principally
garaged in this state unless the policy includes the coverage
described in subsection B of this section.
B. The policy referred to in subsection A of this section shall
provide coverage therein or supplemental thereto for the
protection ofpersons insured thereunder who are legally entitled
to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured
motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily
injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom.
Coverage shall be not less than the amounts or limits prescribed
for bodily injury or death for a policy meeting the requirements
of Section 7-204 of Title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes, as the
same may be hereafter amended; provided, however, that
increased limits of liability shall be offered and purchased if
desired, not to exceed the limits provided in the policy of bodily
injury liability of the insured.98
As suggested by the italicized language, an individual seeking uninsured
motorist proceeds carries the burden of proving that:
1) the injured person is an insured under the [uninsured motorist]
provisions of a policy; 2) the injury to the insured [was] caused
by an accident; 3) the injury ... [arose] out of the "ownership,
maintenance or use" of a motor vehicle; and 4) the injured
insured is "legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or
operator of the uninsured motor vehicle."
99
Risk Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 560, 562 (Okla. 1996) (quoting Shepard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 678
P.2d 250, 251 (Okla. 1983)); see also Graham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 61 P.3d 225 (Okla.
2002).
98. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636(A)-(B) (Supp. 2008) (emphasis added).
99. Ply v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 81 P.3d 643, 647 (Okla. 2003)
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A. Injured Person is an Insured Under Uninsured Motorist Provision
The phrase protection ofpersons insured thereunder,'00 demonstrates
that the mandatory offer of uninsured motorist coverage is tied to the sale
of an underlying motor vehicle or automobile liability insurance
policy. 1' 1  Thus, uninsured motorist coverage must be offered for
purchase in conjunction with a motor vehicle or automobile liability
policy. 10 2  Because it is for the protection of "persons insured
thereunder' ' 10 3 (i.e. liability coverage), uninsured motorist coverage is
coextensive with liability coverage. Therefore, the definition of insured
in the uninsured motorist coverage must be at least as broad as that in the
liability section of the policy.' 4 More significantly, uninsured motorist
coverage stems "from falling within the definition of an 'insured' under
(footnotes omitted).
100. § 3636(B).
101. See Keel v. MFA Ins. Co., 553 P.2d 153 (Okla. 1976); Moon v. Guarantee Ins.
Co., 764 P.2d 1331 (Okla. 1988).
102. See Moser v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 406 (Okla. 1986) (OKLA. STAT. tit.
36, § 3636 applies only to automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policies); GEICO
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Pac. Indem. Co., 115 P.3d 856 (Okla. 2005).
103. § 3636(B).
104. Johnny Parker, The Wacky World of Collision and Comprehensive Coverages:
Intentional Injury and Illegal Activity Exclusions, 79 NEB. L. REv. 75, 82-83 (2000);
O'Hare v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 432 So. 2d 1294 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982);
Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 1354 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995);
First Sec. Bank v. Doe, 760 S.W.2d 863 (Ark. 1988); Robles v. Cal. State Auto. Ass'n,
145 Cal. Rptr. 115 (Ct. App. 1978); Bernal v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 97 P.3d 197
(Colo. Ct. App. 2003) (must offer co-extensive but policyholder may reject and accept
narrower uninsured motorist coverage than liability); Moncrease v. Sirius Am. Ins. Co.,
No. CV054015335S, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3003 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2007);
Frank v. Horizon Assurance Co., No. 87C-AU-46, 1988 Del. Super. LEXIS 43 (Del.
Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 1988); Valiant Ins. Co., v. Webster, 567 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1990); Ropar
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 422 S.E.2d 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of
Haw., 883 P.2d 38 (Haw. 1994); Pellegrini v. Jankoveck, 614 N.E.2d 319 (Il. App. Ct.
1993); Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Speer, 407 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Kats v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 490 N.W.2d 60 (Iowa 1992); Stewart v. Robinson, 521 So. 2d
1241 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Pappas v. Cent. Nat'l Ins. Group of Omaha, 255 N.W.2d 629
(Mich. 1977); Kaysen v. Fed. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 920 (Minn. 1978); Lair v. Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 789 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1990); Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Action Elec.
Co., 593 N.W.2d 275 (Neb. 1999); Danner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 578
N.W.2d 902 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hinkel, 488 P.2d
1151 (Nev. 1971); Turner v. St. Paul Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 676 A.2d 109 (N.H. 1996);
Thedin v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d 703 (N.D. 1994); Ameen v. Prudential
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 110 P.3d 86 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004); De Smet Ins. Co. of S.D. v.
Gibson, 552 N.W.2d 98 (S.D. 1996); Christenberry v. Tipton, 160 S.W.3d 487 (Tenn.
2005).
20091 385
Oklahoma City University Law Review
any given" automobile or motor vehicle insurance policy and "not from
owning an automobile."
10 5
Whether an individual is an insured under the terms of an automobile
liability insurance contract depends entirely upon the provisions of the
policy. 0 6 The parties to the policy are free to "agree upon the terms of
the contract and are [at liberty] to limit or restrict [the] insurer's
liability."'0 7  Liberty of contract, however, is not absolute; where the
contract is ambiguous or violates public policy the court may look
behind the agreement. 10 8 Automobile liability insurance provisions that
define the term insured in such a manner as to exclude a specific or
certain class of individuals are not invalid merely because they
simultaneously deprive the aggrieved party of uninsured motorist
coverage. 0 9  Contract language that excludes an individual from
coverage as an insured under the uninsured motorist provisions of an
insurance policy has been upheld on numerous grounds. For example, in
Shepard v. Farmers Insurance Co., the Oklahoma Supreme Court
validated a clause that denied coverage to a relative of the insured living
in the same household when such relative, or his/her spouse, owned an
automobile, despite the fact that the provision operated to exclude the
plaintiff from the definition of an insured." 10 According to the court, the
provision did not contravene the uninsured motorist law because of the
presumption "that one who owns an automobile has recourse to some
uninsured motorist benefits.""' A similar result was reached in O'Brien
v. Dorrough."2 There the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals upheld the
validity of a named-driver exclusion despite an absence of evidence
105. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wendt, 708 P.2d 581, 586 (Okla. 1985)
(quoting Shepard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 678 P.2d 250, 252 (Okla. 1983)).
106. Shepard, 678 P.2d at 251; O'Brien v. Dorrough, 928 P.2d 322, 324 (Okla. Civ.
App. 1996); Babcock v. Adkins, 695 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Okla. 1984).
107. Shepard, 678 P.2d at 251.
108.
In Oklahoma, a contract violates public policy only if it clearly tends to injure
public health, morals or confidence in administration of law, or if it undermines
the security of individual rights with respect to either personal liability or
private property. Courts will exercise their power to nullify contracts made in
contravention of public policy only rarely, with great caution and in cases that
are free from doubt.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
109. See id. at 251; O'Brien, 928 P.2dat 324-25.
110. Shepard, 678 P.2d at 252.
111. Id. at 252-53.
112. O'Brien, 928 P.2d at 324-25.
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regarding whether the aggrieved party owned a car which would give
rise to the presumption of recourse to uninsured motorist coverage. 13
Because, in the context of liability insurance, the named-driver exclusion
serves a valid purpose-keeping insurance premiums affordable-and
since an insured could refuse uninsured motorist coverage all together,
the O'Brien court refused to hold that an exclusion, which excluded only
one named individual, violated public policy."l
4
While insurers may contractually assume a liability in respect to
uninsured motorist coverage broader than that required by statute, "once
a person is insured under an uninsured motorist policy, subsequent
exclusions inserted by the insurer in the policy.., which dilute and
impermissively limit uninsured motorist coverage are void as violative of
the public policy espoused by 36 O.S. 1981 § 3636."' 1 5 Likewise, any
provision in an insurance policy which ties uninsured motorist coverage
to a specific vehicle rather than a person is also void."16
Individuals coming within the definition of insured under the
uninsured motorist provision of an insurance policy are accorded distinct
rights on the basis of their status. Because the liability coverage omnibus
clause1 7 generally provides coverage to others on the basis of their
relationship with the named insured, spouses and resident relatives of the
named insured's household are accorded the status of "Class 1
insureds."' 8  The liability coverage omnibus clause "also extends
coverage to anyone driving the insured vehicle with the expressed or
general permission of the named insured. Permission, for purposes of
extended coverage, may be expressed or implied." 1 9  Therefore,
permissive users are denominated in the uninsured motorist coverage as
"Class 2 insureds."'
120
Occupants are also classified as class 2 insureds.' 21 The
classification is derived from insurance policy provisions that define the
113. Id. at 325-26.
114. Id. at 326.
115. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wendt, 708 P.2d 581, 583 (Okla. 1985).
116. Id.
117. "'Omnibus clause' is a term of art frequently used in discussions of coverage
provisions but rarely employed in insurance contracts." Parker, supra note 104, at 81.
For a detailed discussion of omnibus coverage and how legislatures have mandated their
inclusion in every automobile or motor vehicle liability policy see id. at 81 & n. 18.
118. Rogers v. Goad, 739 P.2d 519, 521 (Okla. 1987).
119. Parker, supra note 104, at 83, 85; see also id. at 81 & n. 18.
120. Rogers, 739 P.2d at 521.
121. Id.
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term insured as either: (1) "[a]nyone 'occupying' a covered auto"'122 or
(2) "anyone occupying, with your permission, a car we insure.' 23 In
either instance, the word "occupying" is defined in the respective policy
to mean "in, upon, getting in, on, or off" the covered auto.
124
Because the words in, upon, getting in, on, or off are very general
and their meaning often depends upon the context and circumstances
surrounding their use, defining who is an insured in terms of his
occupancy of a covered vehicle is very problematic., 25 For example, in
Wickham v. Equity Fire & Casualty Co., the plaintiff, Curtis Wickham,
stopped to help Christopher McClain, the owner and operator of a
vehicle that had lost its left rear wheel while being driven.126 "Wickham
and McClain searched McClain's trunk by the... glow of a cigarette
lighter to find the necessary tools" to reattach the wheel. 127 As Wickham
was kneeling next to the car, in the process of tightening the last lug nut
to remount the wheel, a car driven by James Wade struck and seriously
injured Wickham.128
"Wickham... sued McClain's insurer, Equity Fire and Casualty
Company... , asserting [that he was] entitled to recover on the
uninsured motorist coverage" of McClain's automobile policy. 29 Equity
denied coverage contending that Wickham was not an insured under the
uninsured motorist coverage because he was not occupying the vehicle at
the time of his injury. 130 According to Equity, Wickham was neither in,
upon, getting in, on, or off the covered auto.'
3
'
In Wickham, the court refused to adopt a bright-line test for
determining whether someone was occupying "a vehicle for purposes of
[uninsured motorist] coverage."'' 32 Instead, the court concluded that the
question of whether the policy definition of "occupying" has been
122. Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Lemons, No. CIV-05-1235-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44521
(W.D. Okla. June 28, 2006) (discussing the insurance policy language).
123. Wickham v. Equity Fire & Cas. Co., 889 P.2d 1258 (Okla. Civ. App. 1994)
(discussing the insurance policy language) (footnote omitted).
124. Lemons, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44521, at *7; see also Wickham, 889 P.2d at
1260.
125. See Wickham, 889 P.2d at 1260.
126. Id. at 1259.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1260 (footnote omitted).
130. Id. at 1260-61.




satisfied should be made on a case-by-case basis, "depending on the
circumstances of the accident, the use of the vehicle, the relevant terms
of the coverage at issue, and any. . . public policy considerations.'' 33
For these reasons, the court concluded that Wickham came within the
policy definition of "occupying."'
134
Because uninsured motorist coverage follows the person and not the
vehicle, a class 1 insured is entitled to the benefits of all uninsured
motorist coverage for which she has paid premiums.' 35 The contractual
expectation of the person paying separate premiums on multiple vehicles
justifies allowing a named insured to aggregate the uninsured motorist
coverage of every vehicle she owns, even those not involved in the
accident, up to the limits of her injury.' 36 Conversely, those qualifying as
class 2 insureds lack the contractual expectation of a named insured and
are restricted to the single-limit coverage of the vehicle they were located
in at the time of injury. 137 A class 2 insured may, however, obtain the
single-limit uninsured motorist proceeds of the vehicle she was located in
when injured, in addition to the uninsured motorist coverage of her
personal automobile insurance policy which was not involved in the
accident.
138
A class 2 insured may also recover the policy limits of both the
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Babcock v. Adkins, 695 P.2d 1340 (Okla. 1984); Keel v. MFA Ins. Co., 553 P.2d
153 (Okla. 1976); Richardson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 619 P.2d 594 (Okla. 1980). In
Oklahoma, insurers are not statutorily required to offer stackable uninsured motorist
coverage. Consequently, the parties may agree in the contract to limit the insurer's
liability to a single uninsured motorist coverage. Such an agreement is not against public
policy when only one premium is charged for multiple vehicles and it unambiguously
reflects the insured's intent to preclude stacking. See Scott v. Cimarron Ins. Co., 774
P.2d 456 (Okla. 1989); Spears v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 114 P.3d 448 (Okla. 2005).
136. Babcock, 695 P.2d 1340; Keel, 553 P.2d 153; Richardson, 619 P.2d 594; Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Craig, 771 P.2d 212 (Okla. 1989) (class 1 insured may stack the
uninsured motorist coverages of a commercial fleet policy).
137. A class 1 insured occupying her own covered vehicle as a passenger retains the
rights accorded to her class 1 status. Occupants or passengers in an insured motorist's
vehicle involved in an accident, who are entitled to uninsured motorist coverage solely
because of their status as passengers, may not stack the uninsured motorist coverage
under separate policies purchased by the owner of the involved vehicle for a noninvolved
vehicle or vehicles unless those passengers also qualify as insureds under those separate
policies. See Babcock, 695 P.2d at 1343; see also Craig, 771 P.2d 212; Rogers v. Goad,
739 P.2d 519 (Okla. 1987) (class 2 insureds may not stack the uninsured motorist
coverage of a commercial fleet policy).
138. Torres v. Kan. City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 407 (Okla. 1993); Stanton v.
Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 747 P.2d 945, 947 (Okla. 1987).
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liability and uninsured motorist coverages of the vehicle involved in the
accident. For example, in Heavner v. Farmers Insurance Co.,139 the
plaintiff, while a passenger in a car driven by Carlos Sturms, was injured
in an accident with another automobile. Sturms was insured by
appellees, Farmers Insurance Company, Inc. and Farmer's Insurance
Group ("Farmers"). Farmers admitted liability and filed an interpleader
action naming as defendants, plaintiff and the occupants of the other
vehicle. 140 Farmers also deposited with the court Sturms' entire $20,000
liability coverage, which was divided among all the passengers.1
4 1
Heavner "was awarded $4,500.00 of the $20,000.00 liability coverage
available for distribution.'
14 2
After the liability coverage was exhausted, Plaintiff subsequently
commenced an action "to recover under the uninsured motorist
provisions of Sturms' policy and under similar provisions of a policy
issued by American Deposit Insurance Company,... [owned by his]
sister-in-law with whom he resided."'143 Following a ruling in favor of
Farmers, the plaintiff appealed asserting that he was entitled "to 'stack'
the liability and uninsured motorist coverage under the same Farmer's
policy."'144 The parties agreed that appellant, Heavner, was "an insured
because he was occupying an insured motor vehicle.' 45
The court in Heavner, construing the 1976 version of the Oklahoma
Uninsured Motorist Act, found that Sturms' vehicle was an uninsured
motor vehicle "[b]ecause the liability insurer (Farmers) [was] not legally
required to pay at least the per person coverage limits ($10,000.00) with
respect to the legal liability of its insured.' 46 Since Farmers paid "only
$4,500.00 under the liability coverage while the per person uninsured
motorist coverage limit of the Farmers policy applicable to [Heavner
was] $10,000.00. [Heavner was] entitled to receive $5,500.00 from
Farmers under the uninsured motorist coverage.' 47  In considering
Heavner's claim against American Deposit Insurance Company, the
court noted that § 3636 expanded uninsured motorist coverage to include
139. Heavner v. Farmers Ins. Co., 663 P.2d 730 (Okla. 1983).










instances "when an injured party's uninsured motorist coverage is greater
than the tortfeasor's liability coverage.' ' 48  Because only $4,500 of
Farmers' "liability coverage was available to [Heavner] and American's
uninsured motorist coverage of $5,000.00 exceed[ed] that by $500.00,"
appellant was entitled to that amount from American. 149 The right of
insured passengers to recover both the liability and uninsured motorist
limits of the same policy has not been lost in subsequent amendments of
the Oklahoma Uninsured Motorist Act.' 50 Because "[t]he same laws and
public policies underlying uninsured motorists coverage extend to
underinsured motorist coverage as well, 15' the precedential value of
Heavner and its progeny is not diminished by the fact that they involved
underinsured motorist disputes.
Despite its inextricable link to liability coverage, uninsured motorist
insurance is a distinct, hybrid form of insurance. The very nature of
liability insurance coverage is different from uninsured motorist
coverage. The former protects the covered person from the
consequences of their own negligence; the latter protects covered parties
from the consequences of the negligence of others. This distinction,
however, is of no consequence when determining the rights of an insured
to sue an insurer for breach of its implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing.
An insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing "does not extend to
every individual entitled to the insurance proceeds. Rather, the implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing extends only to those persons sharing
a contractual or statutory relationship with the insurer.' 52 Thus, "only
individuals in a contractual or statutory relationship with the insurer have
standing to sue for bad faith."' 153  "In the absence of a contractual or
statutory relationship, there is no duty which can be breached.'
' 54
Therefore, third-party claimants who are strangers to the insurance policy
lack standing to assert a bad faith action against an insurer. '5
Class 1 insureds obviously satisfy the requirements for standing to
148. Id. (quoting Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Theus, 592 P.2d 519, 520 (Okla. 1979)).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Pac. Indem. Co., 115 P.3d 856 (Okla.
2005); Lewis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 535 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992).
151. Lewis, 838 P.2d at 538.
152. Johnny C. Parker, The Development of First-Party Extracontractual Insurance
Litigation in Oklahoma: An Analytical Examination, 31 TULSA L.J. 57, 69 (1995).
153. Id.
154. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362, 364 (Okla. 1984).
155. Id. at 364-65.
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bring a bad faith claim against their insurer.1 56  The answer to the
question of whether a class 2 insured possessed standing to assert a bad
faith claim against an uninsured motorist carrier was less obvious until
the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Townsend v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.157  Therein, the court applied the
contractual or statutory relationship test to determine whether a class 2
insured had standing to assert a bad faith claim against an uninsured
motorist carrier. 158 According to the court in Townsend, because the
named insured, Penn, purchased uninsured motorist protection for
himself, family members, permissive users and passengers, a class 2
insured had "a legitimate contractual expectation that the insurer would
act in good faith and deal fairly with all insureds.' 59  Furthermore,
because subsection B of the Uninsured Motorist Act "requires insurers to
offer uninsured motorist coverage for the protection of persons insured
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or
operators of uninsured motor vehicles[,] ... the legislature established a
statutory relationship between [uninsured motorist carriers] and all
insureds."'
160
B. Injury to Insured was Caused by an Accident
The objective of uninsured motorist insurance "is to protect the
insured from the effects of personal injury resulting from an accident
with another motorist who carries no insurance or is underinsured.'
' 61
The requirement that the injury to insured was "caused by an accident" is
traceable to the insuring agreement provisions of liability and uninsured
motorist coverages.162  The typical uninsured motorist coverage
provision provides:
PART C-UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE
156. Newport v. USAA, 11 P.3d 190 (Okla. 2000); Brown v. Patel, 157 P.3d 117
(Okla. 2007).
157. Townsend v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 236 (Okla. 1993).
158. Id. at 237-38.
159. Id. at 238.
160. Id.
161. Uptegraft v. Home Ins. Co., 662 P.2d 681, 683-84 (Okla. 1983).
162. The phrase "caused by accident" is construed in the same manner for purposes of
determining both liability and uninsured motorist coverage. Compare U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. Briscoe, 239 P.2d 754 (Okla. 1951), and Penley v. Gulf Ins. Co., 414 P.2d 305




A. We will pay compensatory damages which an "insured" is
legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
"uninsured motor vehicle" because of "bodily injury":
1. Sustained by an "insured"; and
2. Caused by accident.
The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must
arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the "uninsured
motor vehicle."
' 163
Because an insurance policy is a contract, it is construed as every other
contract. 164 Accordingly,
The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary
and popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal
meaning, unless used by the parties in a technical sense, or
unless a special meaning is given them by usage, in which case
the latter must be followed.
65
The initial inquiry, in a dispute over the meaning of language in an
insurance policy, is to determine whether the policy language at issue is
ambiguous. 166 If not ambiguous the word or phrase is accorded its plain,
ordinary meaning in the popular sense. 167 Likewise, because the phrase
"caused by accident" is typically not defined in the policy, courts have
163. Insurance Services Office, Inc., Personal Auto Policy PP 00 01 06 98, at 5 (1997),
available at http://www.scc.virginia.gov/division/boi/webpages/inspagedocs/sfppp
00016h.pdf.
164. Wiley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 534 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Okla. 1974).
165. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 160 (2001).
166. Wynn v. Avemco Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 572, 575 (Okla. 1998).
167. McDonald v. Schreiner, 28 P.3d 574, 577 (Okla. 2001).
The absence of an express definition of a word within the policy does not
necessarily render the word ambiguous. Similarly, the fact that a word cannot
be precisely defined to make clear its application in every factual situation does
not mean the word is ambiguous. Rather, the test to be applied in determining
whether a word is ambiguous is whether the word "is susceptible to two
interpretations" on its face.
Cranfill v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 49 P.3d 703, 706 (Okla. 2002) (quoting Littlefield v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 857 P.2d 65, 69 (Okla. 1993)) (citations omitted).
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not accorded it a technical legal meaning.1 68 Undefined terms are treated
like unambiguous terms and accorded their ordinary and usual
meaning. 69 Dictionaries are often used by courts to determine the plain,
ordinary, and usual meaning of an undefined term.
The debate over the meaning of the phrase "caused by accident," in
the context of uninsured motorist coverage, was put to rest by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Willard v. Kelley. 7° Therein, George
Willard, while on patrol as a police officer, spotted a vehicle driven by a
suspected armed robber, Mark Kelley.17" ' When "Willard attempted to
stop [Kelley], a chase ensued. After colliding with [several] cars,
Kelley's [car] came to a [stop]. 172 Willard stopped the police car and
drew his weapon as he stepped from beside the squad car. 173 He then
heard and felt the effect of a gunshot and ducked behind the squad car
door as Kelley fired more bullets from his automobile. 7 4  Several of
Kelley's bullets penetrated the squad car's door and struck Willard. 175
Willard and his wife sued both Kelley and Prudential Property and
Casualty Insurance Company-their personal automobile insurance
carrier. 176  From Prudential "they sought to recover the limits of the
policy's uninsured motorist... coverage.', 77  Prudential argued that
coverage was afforded neither by the uninsured motorist statute nor by
the policy because the injurious event was not an accident which arose
out of the use of an uninsured automobile.
78
168. See Penley v. Gulf Ins. Co., 414 P.2d 305 (Okla. 1966). If a term is specifically
defined in an insurance policy, courts will normally look to that definition to determine
its meaning. However, for the contract definition to control, it must be reasonably clear
and unambiguous.
169. See Flitton v. Equity Fire & Cas. Co., 824 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Okla. 1992)
(undefined terms or words in an insurance policy, if unambiguous, must be accepted in
their ordinary and popular sense).
170. Willard v. Kelley, 803 P.2d 1124 (Okla. 1990).
171. Id. at 1125-26.






178. Id. The policy provision provided:
"[Insurer is obligated] [t]o pay all sums which the insured ... shall be legally
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
automobile because of bodily injury . . . sustained by the insured, caused by




According to the court, the character of the injurious event for
purposes of determining whether it constitutes an accident should be
evaluated from the perspective of the insured. 79 The reasonable person
standard is used to assess the character of the injurious events from the
insured's perspective.' 80 Consequently, "even if [the] insured [is] the
victim of an intentional [or criminal] act, the nature of the injury is
nonetheless viewed as accidental, so long as the harm was not the
reasonably foreseeable result of the insured's own ... misconduct."'
' 81
Thus,
in the absence of a contrary provision, an automobile insurance
policy which includes uninsured motorist and medical payments
coverage as well as insures against injuries "caused by accident,"
does afford protection for harm that is unprovoked, unforeseen,
and unintended on the part of the insured.
82
C. Injury Arising Out of the Ownership, Maintenance, or Use of a Motor
Vehicle
The phrase "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle[,]" as used in the Uninsured Motorist Act, is rooted in the
coverage of the liability insurance policy that serves as the foundation for
the required mandatory offer of uninsured motorist coverage.183 As used
in the liability provision of an automobile insurance policy, the phrase
can cover a broad range of factual events. 84 However, the uninsured
motorist statute restricts coverage to damages an insured is legally
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle which "aris[e] out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle."' 85 Thus, the range of factual events that come within the
protection afforded by uninsured motorist coverage are statutorily limited
to situations involving an owner or operator of an uninsured motor
Id. (quoting the insurance policy) (added emphasis omitted).
179. Id. at 1128-29.
180. Id. at 1129.
181. Id.
182. Id. (emphasis omitted).
183. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sanders, 803 P.2d 688, 690 (Okla. 1990) (quoting
OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636 (1981)).
184. Id. at691.
185. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636(A) (Supp. 2008).
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vehicle. 186
In Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Sanders, Laura Sanders and
Michael Houghton were seated in a 1967 Oldsmobile Cutlass in a
parking lot when they were subdued by Scott Hain and Robert
Lambert. 187 "Hain and Lambert forced Sanders to drive. After driving
for a period of time, Sanders was [instructed] to stop.' ' 188 Houghton was
ordered out of the car, robbed of his money and truck keys, tied up, and
locked in the trunk of the car.' 89 Hain or Lambert then drove the car,
stopped, and locked Sanders in the trunk with Houghton. 190 At some
juncture, the car was driven to an isolated area. 191 With Sanders and
Houghton still in the trunk, Hain and Lambert cut the fuel line of the car
and ignited it.' 92 "Sanders and Houghton died as a result of thermal
bums and smoke inhalation."'
' 93
The 1967 Oldsmobile Cutlass was insured by Safeco under a policy
with William Sanders-Laura's father. 194 Houghton owned a 1985 Isuzu
truck insured by Aetna. 95 An uninsured motorist claim was submitted to
Safeco and subsequently denied. 196  Safeco then filed a declaratory
judgment action in federal district court. 19 7 Based on the foregoing facts,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
certified the following questions to the Oklahoma Supreme Court:'
98
1. Does the murder of Sanders and Houghton when they were
murdered by being burned to death in the trunk of the
automobile in question "arise out of the.., use of a motor
vehicle" as contemplated by 36 O.S. 1981, § 3636?...
2. If the deaths arose out of the use of a motor vehicle, was there
a causal connection between the use of the vehicle and the
murders?...












198. Id. at 689-90.
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3. If the causal connection existed, do the acts of Hain and
Lambert after the car was parked, constitute acts of independent
significance to sever any causal link?...
4. Were Hain and Lambert "operators of (an) uninsured motor
vehicle" when they set the vehicle on fire and murdered Sanders
and Houghton?199
According to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, "in ascertaining the
scope of the mandated UM coverage 'arising out of the use of a motor
vehicle' and 'caused by' or causal connection are not synonymous.
200
Causal connection is a question of fact.2°' So, if the facts establish that a
motor vehicle or any part of a motor vehicle is the dangerous
instrumentality that triggered the chain of events leading to injury, the
injury arose out of the use of the motor vehicle as contemplated by the
uninsured motorist statute.
The inquiry however, does not stop there. If the injury arose out of
the use of a motor vehicle, the proof must also establish a causal
connection between the motoring or transportational use of the vehicle
by an uninsured motorist and the injury to the insured.20 2 The
determination of whether a causal connection exists between the
transportational use and the injury is made on the basis of a two prong
test: "1) is a use of the vehicle connected to the injury; and, 2) is that use
related to the transportation nature of the vehicle. 2 3 Only uses that are
related to the transportation purpose of a motor vehicle and that cause
harm are causally connected to the injury for purposes of uninsured
motorist coverage.2°  In order to satisfy the causal connection
requirement, the evidence must establish "that the acts of [the] uninsured
motorist, which were related to the transportational nature of the motor
vehicle, resulted in or contributed to the injury."20 5 Ultimately, whether a
use of an uninsured motor vehicle is related to the transportation nature
199. Id. at 690.
200. Id. at 691. Strict application of tort law is not required when courts decide causal
connection in an insurance dispute between uninsured motorist carriers and their
insureds. Uptegraft v. Home Ins. Co., 662 P.2d 681 (Okla. 1983).
201. Sanders, 803 P.2d at 692.
202. Id. at 694.
203. Id. at 692.
204. See Sanders, 803 P.2d 688; Mayer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 944 P.2d
288 (Okla. 1997).
205. Sanders, 803 P.2d at 695.
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of the vehicle is a question of fact.206
However, the causal relationship, once established, may be severed.
As observed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Safeco,
the acts of cutting the fuel line and igniting the fuel after the car
was parked, which caused the car to bum, are so contrary to its
transportation nature of the vehicle that, as a matter of law, these
events are not related to its transportation nature and injury
resulting therefrom is not within the UM coverage mandated by
§ 3636.207
Severance occurs only if the intervening force is unforeseeable from the
perspective of the original tortfeasor.2 °8
Uninsured motorist disputes based on an injury, arising out of the
maintenance of an uninsured motor vehicle are subjected to the same
analytical framework as disputes involving injury arising out of the use
of an uninsured motor vehicle.20 9  The word "maintenance" is to be
accorded its ordinary literal meaning.210  When added to the words
"arising out of," the word takes on a broad, general, and comprehensive
meaning.21' This meaning is broad enough to include situations where
the injury resulted from a noncontemporaneous negligent maintenance of
an uninsured motor vehicle.212
D. Insured is Legally Entitled to Recover Damages from the Owner or
Operator of the Uninsured Motor Vehicle
1. Legally Entitled to Recover
An action for uninsured motorist coverage is contractual in nature.2" 3
206. Id. at 693. The fact-sensitive nature of the causal-connection inquiry broadens the
number of factual circumstances that might occur under circumstances that would arise
out of a vehicle's use. See Byus v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 845 (Okla. 1996);
Willard v. Kelley, 803 P.2d 1124 (Okla. 1990); Hulsey v. Mid-Am. Preferred Ins. Co.,
777 P.2d 932 (Okla. 1989).
207. Sanders, 803 P.2d at 695.
208. Byus, 912 P.2d at 847-48.
209. Ply v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 81 P.3d 643 (Okla. 2003).
210. Id. at 649 n.13.
211. Id. at 649-50.
212. Id. at 650.
213. Uptegraft v. Home Ins. Co., 662 P.2d 681 (Okla. 1983). Because the nature of an
uninsured motorist dispute is inherent ex contractu, an action for recovery of uninsured
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Consequently, an insured's rights against an uninsured motorist provider
arise from the contract rather than in tort. 214  Uninsured motorist
insurance disputes combine tort liability and contract liability into one
action. The obligation of the uninsured motorist to respond in money
damage is governed by tort law and that of the insurer is governed by
contract. The contractual nature of uninsured motorist coverage also
precludes an insurer from stepping into the shoes of the tortfeasor in'
determining its liability under the uninsured motorist provision of the.
policy.215  Uninsured motorist coverage is first-party coverage which
reflects an insurer's promise to indemnify its insured for injuries caused
by another.21 6 In this context, "'legally entitled to recover' simply
mean[s] that the insured must be able to establish fault on the part of the
uninsured motorist which gives rise to damages and prove the extent of
those damages. 21 7 It does not require the insured to prove every element
of a viable tort claim against the uninsured motorist.218 "Legally entitled
to recover" requires that there be a culpable tortfeasor-"someone who
has committed a wrong from which the insured has suffered damage,
before uninsured motorist coverage can come into play., 219 The phrase
merely exemplifies the tort aspect of the uninsured motorist claim.
2. Owner or Operator
The uninsured motorist statute recognizes two groups of persons
from whom an injured insured may be legally entitled to recover: (1)
owners of uninsured motor vehicles; or (2) operators of uninsured
motorist benefits is governed by the statute of limitations applicable to contracts. Id. at
683. The statute of limitations on an action for uninsured motorist benefits begins to run
when the insurance contract is breached and not when the accident occurred. Wille v.
GEICO Cas. Co., 2 P.3d 888, 892 (Okla. 2000).
214. Barfield v. Barfield, 742 P.2d 1107 (Okla. 1987).
215. Uptegraft, 662 P.2d 681; Barfield, 742 P.2d 1107.
216. Uptegraft, 662 P.2d at 683-86.
217. Id. at 685.
218. Id.
219. Martin v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 49, 51 (Okla. 1996) (three-
year-old child found too young to form culpability required to satisfy the "legally entitled
to recover" requirement of uninsured motorist statute); see also Ply v. Nat'l Union Fire
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 81 P.3d 643, 649 (Okla. 2003) ("employer may be at fault
within the meaning of phrase 'legally entitled to recover . . . ,' where a supervisor, acting
[in the scope of his employment], provides [flawed] or negligent instructions ... to an
employee [regarding] the use of an employer-owned motor vehicle and the employee is
injured while following [those] instructions.").
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vehicles. 220 The uninsured motorist statute neither defines nor provides
guidance for interpretation of the terms owner or operator. Both are
common terms and should be construed in their ordinary sense. In this
context, the term "operator" has been construed to mean "'one that
produces a physical effect or engages himself in the mechanical aspect of
any process or activity. ' ' , 21 This definition is broad enough to include
"any person who is engaged in activity related to the transportation
nature of the vehicle. 222 Thus, a driver or nondriver/passenger, who is
in a position to exercise meaningful or coercive control over the driver
comes within the definition of the word operator. 3
The owner of an uninsured motor vehicle is subject to the same
liability exposure as an operator. This is true even if no vehicle or
person, other than the insured, is present at the time of the injury.2 24 The
statutory language "legally entitled to recover damages" clearly
references the tort aspect of an uninsured motorist claim. This language
is modified by the prepositional phrase, "from owners or operators, 225
indicating the parties against whom there is a right to recover in tort.
Thus, the insured must prove that he is entitled to bring a tort claim for
damages against the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.
The owner or operator's liability for damages must however arise "out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of' an uninsured motor vehicle. 26
3. Uninsured Motor Vehicle
Oklahoma's uninsured motorist "statute does not precisely define the
term uninsured motor vehicle., 227 It merely provides that:
C. For the purposes of this coverage the term "uninsured
motor vehicle" shall include an insured motor vehicle where the
liability insurer thereof is unable to make payment with respect
220. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636(B) (Supp. 2008).
221. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sanders, 803 P.2d 688, 696 (Okla. 1990) (quoting
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1581
(UNABRIDGED 1961)); see also Byus v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 845, 848 (Okla.
1996).
222. Sanders, 803 P.2d at 696.
223. Byus, 912 P.2d at 848.
224. Ply, 81 P.3d at 648.
225. § 3636(B).
226. § 3636(A).
227. Gates v. Eller, 22 P.3d 1215, 1218 (Okla. 2001).
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to the legal liability of its insured within the limits specified
therein because of insolvency. For the purposes of this coverage
the term "uninsured motor vehicle" shall also include an insured
motor vehicle, the liability limits of which are less than the
amount of the claim of the person or persons making such claim,
regardless of the amount of coverage of either of the parties in
relation to each other.228
Subsection C recognizes that a motor vehicle with liability insurance can
constitute an uninsured motor vehicle-(1) where the liability carrier of
an insured vehicle is unable to make payment because of insolvency; or
(2) the liability limits of the tortfeasor are less than the amount of the
claim-i.e., underinsured.2 29 The definitions provided in subsection C
must be read in conjunction with subsection B which expands the
definition to also include vehicles with no liability coverage-and hit-
and-run motor vehicles.23° Oklahoma's uninsured motorist statute does
not specifically exclude any class of vehicles from the definition of
uninsured motor vehicle. Consequently, policy definitions that limit
uninsured motorist coverage by defining the term uninsured motor
vehicle restrictively are void and unenforceable. 23' Nevertheless, the
definitions of uninsured motor vehicle included in sections B and C of
the uninsured motorist statute focus on the vehicle.
The injured insured carries the burden of proving that the other
vehicle was uninsured unless the insurer contractually assumed the
burden of proof.23 2  An insured motor vehicle does not become an
uninsured motor vehicle merely because the statute of limitations expires
on the tort claim causing the tortfeasor's liability insurance to become
unavailable.233 However, an insured motor vehicle is deemed to be an
uninsured motor vehicle when it is driven by a nonpermissive uninsured
228. § 3636(C).
229. In the context of an underinsured motor vehicle, the insured is not required to get
an adjudication of damages from the tortfeasor prior to seeking the uninsured motorist
proceeds. Lamfu v. GuideOne Ins. Co., 131 P.3d 712, 715 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005).
However, the claim must be supported by evidence establishing a prima facie right to
recover. Id. Bare allegations of the existence of unliquidated damages for pain and
suffering are not sufficient proof of the uninsured status of the vehicle. Id.
230. See Tidmore v. Fullman, 646 P.2d 1278 (Okla. 1982).
231. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Greer, 777 P.2d 941 (Okla. 1989); Brown v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 684 P.2d 1195 (Okla. 1984).
232. Gates v. Eller, 22 P.3d 1215 (Okla. 2001); Brown, 684 P.2d 1195.
233. Gates, 22 P.3d at 1220.
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operator.234 Decisional law also suggests that an insured motor vehicle is
uninsured when involved in an accident while being driven by an
uninsured permissive operator.235 The case law definitions focus on the
--status of the owner or operator. Because the statutory and decisional law
definitions encompass both the vehicle and owners/operators,
respectively, it is impossible to determine which aspect of the statutory
language, "who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or
,,236operators, is dispositive of whether a vehicle is uninsured.
Consequently, the meaning of the statutory language "uninsured motor
vehicle" is subject to the court's broad discretion, constrained only by the
legislative intent and purpose of the statute.237 Regardless of the reason
for classifying the vehicle as uninsured, the uninsured motorist carrier's
obligations to the insured are the same.238
Evidence in place, an injured insured may assert his uninsured
motorist claim pursuant to any one of the following four options:
(1) He may file an action directly against his insurance
company without joining the uninsured motorist as a party
defendant and litigate all of the issues of liability and
damages in that one action.
(2) He may file an action joining both the uninsured motorist
and the insurance company as party defendants and litigate
all issues of liability and damages in one action.
(3) He may file an action against the uninsured motorist
without joining the insurance company as a party defendant,
but give adequate notice of the filing and pendency of such
action to the insurance company so they take whatever
action they desire, including intervention.
234. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sanders, 803 P.2d 688, 695-96 (Okla. 1990).
235. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wendt, 708 P.2d 581 (Okla. 1985).
236. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636(B) (Supp. 2008).
237. "The majority view.., is that a vehicle of which either the owner or [operator] is
covered by [the] minimum insurance coverage is not 'uninsured' even though one of
[these individuals] has no insurance." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cummings, 778
P.2d 370, 374 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989). See also Stordahl v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 564
P.2d 63 (Alaska 1977); Evenchik v. State Farm Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 99 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984); Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Means, 362 So. 2d 135 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978); Sorbo v. Mendiola, 361 N.W.2d 851 (Minn. 1985); Vadnais v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 354 N.W.2d 607 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Motorists Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Tomanski, 271 N.E.2d 924 (Ohio 1971); Fielder v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 378 A.2d
1386 (R.I. 1977).
238. Gates v. Eller, 22 P.3d 1215 (Okla. 2001).
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(4) He may file an action against the uninsured motorist and
give no notice to the insurance company.239
If the court determines "that no prejudice will result in litigating all of
the issues in one trial, the insurer is bound by the judgment as to all
issues, including liability and damages under the options described in
one, two and three. 24° Only option four permits the insurance company
not to be bound by the judgment.24 1 Under option two, evidence as to the
names of either the tortfeasor's liability carrier or the insured/plaintiff's
uninsured motorist carrier and the terms of the respective insurance
contracts are prejudicial and should not be submitted to the jury.242
III. UNINSURED MOTORIST CARRIER'S OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS
Uninsured motorist carriers are not obligated to explain uninsured
motorist coverage as a precondition to an effective statutory rejection.243
However, they are obligated to investigate, evaluate, negotiate, and pay
24an insured's claim in a reasonable manner. z4 Since uninsured motorist
coverage is primary first-party coverage, and given the fact that the
insured may sue his own insurer without first obtaining a judgment
against the uninsured motorist, insurance companies cannot avoid or
delay their obligation to pay by requiring the insured to exhaust all
available liability insurance prior to receiving uninsured motorist
245benefits. Furthermore, because uninsured motorist coverage is viewed
as primary first-party coverage, an uninsured motorist carrier, once its
evaluation of the likely worth of the claim exceeds the tortfeasor's
239. Keel v. MFA Ins. Co., 553 P.2d 153, 158 (Okla. 1976) (citation omitted); see also
Daiglc v. Hamilton, 782 P.2d 1379 (Okla. 1989) (injured insured may not bring a direct
action against tortfeasor's insurer).
240. Keel, 553 P.2d at 159.
241. Id.
242. Tidmore v. Fullman, 646 P.2d 1278, 1283 (Okla. 1982).
243. Silver v. Slusher, 770 P.2d 878 (Okla. 1988).
244. Barnes v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 11 P.3d 162 (Okla. 2000); Buzzard v.
Farmers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1991) (the investigation and evaluation must be
independent-the carrier may not rely on the investigation or evaluation of the
tortfeasor's carrier); Newport v. USAA, 11 P.3d 190 (Okla. 2000) (lowball offers less
than an insurer's own evaluation of the claim can constitute bad faith); Brown v. Patel,
157 P.3d 117 (Okla. 2007).
245. Everaard v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 842 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1988);
Barnes, 11 P.3d 162; Mustain v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 925 P.2d 533 (Okla. 1996);
Buzzard, 824 P.2d 1105.
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liability limits, is liable for the entire amount of its insured's loss from
the first dollar up to the policy limits without regard to the presence of
other coverage.246
Implicit in these obligations is the duty of good faith and fair
dealing.247  Because the duty of good faith and fair dealing is
nondelegable, insurance companies cannot avoid liability by delegating
their responsibilities to independent contractors, including legal
counsel.248 An insurer does not breach its duty of good faith by litigating
a legitimate dispute with its insured.249 However, breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing can occur when an insurer's litigation conduct
has no legitimate or reasonable purpose.25°
Section 3636(E) of the Oklahoma Uninsured Motorist Act provides
that:
The insurer making such payment shall, to the extent thereof, be
entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment resulting
from the exercise of any rights of recovery of such person
against any person or organization legally responsible for the
bodily injury for which such payment is made, including the
proceeds recoverable from the assets of the insolvent insurer.251
Pursuant to this rule of statutory subrogation, an uninsured motorist
carrier, upon payment of the claim, is entitled to subrogation from the
tortfeasor.252 If the injured insured affirmatively destroys the carrier's
subrogation right against the wrongdoer, by settlement or release, he
246. Burch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 977 P.2d 1057 (Okla. 1998) (all
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage is primary-there is no such thing as excess
UM coverage in Oklahoma).
247. See cases cited supra note 244.
248. Barnes, 11 P.3d at 167 n.5.
249. Manis v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 760 (Okla. 1984).
250. Brown v. Patel, 157 P.3d 117 (Okla. 2007).
251. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636(E) (2001). Subsection (E)
creates subrogation rights to guard against one insurer shifting the burden of
loss to another or escaping the burden of loss through token settlements....
Under § 3636, the injured insured has a right to an indemnity unburdened
by contract provisions that control priority among multiple UM insurers. . ..
Payment entitles the insurer to a judicial determination of the primary,
secondary, and tertiary priority among insurers pursuant to the applicable UM
insurance policies.
Mustain v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 925 P.2d 533, 536 (Okla. 1996).
252. Porter v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 643 P.2d 302 (Okla. 1982).
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forfeits his right to the uninsured motorist coverage.253 There are
however, exceptions to the general rule that destruction of the insurer's
subrogation right operates as a complete defense to an action on the
policy. For example, where the insurer's conduct constitutes a breach of
contract, waiver, or estoppel, the injured insured's destruction of the
insurer's right of subrogation does not constitute a complete defense.254
Estoppel arises when an insurer denies the uninsured motorist claim, 255
fails to investigate, or unjustifiably delays the negotiations or engages in
conduct that causes the insured to believe benefits will not be forfeited
and the insured then settles with the wrongdoer.256 A failure to offer
uninsured motorist coverage, which leads an insured to settle with the
tortfeasor believing that such coverage does not exist, constitutes a
constructive denial of coverage, which also precludes the insurer from
asserting destruction of its subrogation right as a defense. 7
Section 3636(E) further provides that:
Provided, however, with respect to payments made by reason of
the coverage described in subsection C of this section, the
insurer making such payment shall not be entitled to any right of
recovery against such tort-feasor in excess of the proceeds
recovered from the assets of the insolvent insurer of said tort-
feasor. Provided further, that any payment made by the insured
tort-feasor shall not reduce or be a credit against the total
liability limits as provided in the insured's own uninsured
motorist coverage. Provided further, that if a tentative
agreement to settle for liability limits has been reached with an
insured tort-feasor, written notice shall be given by certified mail
to the uninsured motorist coverage insurer by its insured. Such
written notice shall include:
1. Written documentation of pecuniary losses incurred,
including copies of all medical bills; and
2. Written authorization or a court order to obtain reports
253. Id. at 305. See also Frey v. Independence Fire & Cas. Co., 698 P.2d 17 (Okla.
1985) (covenant not to sue given by insured to tortfeasor operated as a complete defense
to uninsured motorist claim because it destroyed insurer's subrogation right); Burch v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 977 P.2d 1057 (Okla. 1998).
254. Sexton v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 816 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1991).
255. Id. at 1138-39.
256. Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1991).
257. Robertson v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 836 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Okla. 1992).
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from all employers and medical providers. Within sixty (60)
days of receipt of this written notice, the uninsured motorist
coverage insurer may substitute its payment to the insured for the
tentative settlement amount. The uninsured motorist coverage
insurer shall then be entitled to the insured's right of recovery to
the extent of such payment and any settlement under the
uninsured motorist coverage. If the uninsured motorist coverage
insurer fails to pay the insured the amount of the tentative tort
settlement within sixty (60) days, the uninsured motorist
coverage insurer has no right to the proceeds of any settlement or
judgment, as provided herein, for any amount paid under the
uninsured motorist coverage.258
Because an insured's voluntary settlement with an uninsured motorist
destroys the uninsured motorist carrier's subrogation rights and operates
as a forfeiture of the benefits afforded in the policy, the Oklahoma
legislature, in section 3636(E)(1)-(2), created a mechanism by which an
insured could receive the equivalent of a settlement offer from the
tortfeasor, while at the same time protecting the underinsured motorist
carrier's subrogation rights against the wrongdoer.259
Once notified of a tentative settlement, the uninsured motorist
carrier, in order to preserve its subrogation rights, must "'substitute its
payment to the insured for the tentative settlement amount' and 'then [it
will] be entitled to the insured's right of recovery to the extent of such
payment and any settlement under the [UIM] coverage.',, 260 If substitute
payment is not forthcoming the "'insurer has no right to the proceeds of
any settlement or judgment... for any amount.' ' 26' The substitute
payment for the tentative liability limits settlement offer is distinct from
the underinsured motorist coverage.262 Substitute payment "does not
relieve the [underinsured motorist insurer] of its responsibility to pay to
its insured the full amount of [the claim] when a reasonable evaluation of
the insured's injuries.. . equal or exceed the limits of both the
tortfeasor's liability coverage and the [underinsured motorist]
coverage. 263
258. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3636(E) (2001).
259. Barnes v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 11 P.3d 162, 168 (Okla. 2000).
260. Id. at 173 (quoting § 3636(E)(2)) (added emphasis omitted).





The express language of section 3636(E) does not preclude the
recovery of underinsured motorist benefits when an insured fails to
follow the precise language of the notice of settlement provision and
impairs the insurer's subrogation rights. Because the rule of subrogation
is not absolute, equitable principles should be used to determine whether
a forfeiture of the policy proceeds would be unjust.264  Thus, an
uninsured motorist carrier that is precluded from exercising its right to
subrogation against the tortfeasor should be required to pay in the
absence of proof that the insured conducted himself in a manner that
manifested a knowing and affirmative awareness of the impairment of
the insurer's rights resulting in actual prejudice.265
In Keel v. MFA Insurance Co., the court recognized that an insured
possessed of a claim against an uninsured motorist had four litigation
* 266Ththdoptions. The third option expressly allows an insurance company to
intervene in the insured's action against an uninsured motorist.
267
Intervention may be classified as either intervention of right or
permissive intervention.268 Intervention of right is allowed:
1. When a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene;
or,
2. When the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and [he]
is so situated that the disposition of [that] action may as a
practical matter impair or impede [his] ability to protect that
interest.269
In order to intervene as a matter of right:
(1) the motion to intervene must be timely; (2) the intervenor
must claim a significant protectable interest relating to the
264. See Johnny C. Parker, The Made Whole Doctrine: Unraveling the Enigma
Wrapped in the Mystery of Insurance Subrogation, 70 Mo. L. REv. 723 (2005).
265. See Phillips v. N.H. Ins. Co., 263 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001); Strong v. Hanover
Ins. Co., 106 P.3d 604 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004).
266. Keel v. MFA Ins. Co., 553 P.2d 153, 158 (Okla. 1976).
267. Id. "(3) He may file an action against the uninsured motorist without joining the
insurance company as a party defendant, but give adequate notice of the filing and
pendency of such action to the insurance company so they take whatever action they
desire, including intervention." Id.
268. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2024 (Supp. 2008).
269. § 2024(A).
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property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) the
disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or
impede the applicant's ability to protect its interest; and (4) the
existing parties may not adequately represent the applicant's
interest.27°
Generally, intervention as a matter of right should not be allowed when a
party to the controversy adequately represents the interest of an
intervenor.27'
In the context of an uninsured-motorist-coverage claim, the
insurance company's right to subrogation is of the same nature as the
insured's claim against the uninsured motorist.272  Consequently,
intervention as a matter of right should be denied because the objective
of the insurance company seeking to intervene is identical to that of the
insured.273 As explained by the court in Brown v. Patel,
an intervenor's interest must be "significantly protectable" or
"direct, substantial, [and] legally protectable." An interest that is
remote from the subject matter of the proceeding, or that is
contingent upon the occurrence of a sequence of events before it
becomes colorable, will not satisfy the rule for intervention as of
right.274
In the absence of payment an insurer has no subrogation interest--"a
potential subrogation interest against an insured's alleged tortfeasor, by
itself, is too remote to justify an insurer's right to intervene as a matter of
right. 2
75
Because the court favors intervention and joinder of parties as a
convenient or pragmatic means of settling controversies relating to the
same subject matter, an insurer not entitled to intervene as a matter of
right may seek permissive intervention when its claim or defense and the
276
main action have a question of law or fact in common. Permissive
270. Brown v. Patel, 157 P.3d 117, 124 (Okla. 2007) (these are referred to as the





274. Id. at 125 (footnotes omitted).
275. Id. (emphasis omitted).
276. Id. at 123-24; Keel v. MFA Ins. Co., 553 P.2d 153 (Okla. 1976).
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intervention may also be proper when the insurer merely desires to
277
monitor the action. The right to intervene does not necessarily mean
that the applicant will be allowed to participate in every aspect of the
case. 278  "'The court can take any appropriate steps to prevent the
intervenor from prejudicing the trial of the action.",,279
IV. CONCLUSION
Uninsured motorist law is purely a creature of statute. The
legislature enacted the Oklahoma Uninsured Motorist Act in response to
the growing menace of uninsured drivers who left innocent, injured
victims without compensation. Uninsured motorist coverage in
Oklahoma serves a vital purpose-"to protect the insured from the
effects of personal injury resulting from an accident with another
motorist who carries no insurance or is underinsured., 280 The Oklahoma
uninsured motorist statute is remedial in nature and mandates the
inclusion of uninsured motorist coverage in motor vehicle insurance
policies. Consequently, it has been liberally construed to accomplish its
legislative purpose. Guided by the single, solitary purpose of uninsured
motorist coverage, Oklahoma's uninsured motorist law has developed
along a consistent path with no major shifts in public policy. In keeping
with the purpose and nature of the statute, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
"has an avowed 'tendency to protect the insured's right to collect from
the UM carrier.,,'
28
277. Brown, 157 P.3d 117.
278. Landrum v. Nat'l Union Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 324 (Okla. 1996).
279. Id. at 328 (quoting the committee comments to OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2024
(1993)).
280. Uptegraft v. Home Ins. Co., 662 P.2d 681, 683-84 (Okla. 1983).
281. Phillips v. N.H. Ins. Co., 263 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Burch v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 977 P.2d 1057, 1061 n.14 (Okla. 1998)).
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